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ABSTRACT 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is less likely to reach its goal of establishing 
an Islamic state in Algeria than at any time since its earlier history as the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA).  Yet the group endures. The apparent resilience of AQIM relies less on its 
actual organization than the environmental factors that have allowed it to persist. By co-
opting local anti-government groups, Algerian jihadists have long been allowed to live 
among and collaborate with Berber and Tuareg separatists. Turning to international 
notoriety to augment its local jihad the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) 
became AQIM even though an Al-Qaeda link had long since been established. Effective 
Algerian security measures have pushed portions of AQIM to ungoverned spaces where 
regional security pressure is less existent and illicit networks are numerous. 
Potential ends for AQIM rely heavily on Algeria to bear the weight of the effort, 
whereas Sahelian initiatives are peripheral to a complete end. U.S. strategy should 
subordinate the Sahel focus, as a Sahelian solution is not sufficient, while an Algerian 
solution is both necessary and sufficient to AQIM’s demise. AQIM represents a lower 
priority challenge that, if not dealt with properly, can become a major priority or drag on 
indefinitely, like the FARC in Colombia. The U.S. must strive to meet AQIM with the 
most appropriate solution with the least force possible to expedite its departure, so that 
U.S. CT efforts can be engaged elsewhere against remaining Al-Qaeda affiliates. 
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1. THE THREAT 
A lethal terrorist organization, once thought to be on the verge of collapse has re-
emerged. In 2010, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was responsible for killing 
171 members of the Algerian Police/Military/Security forces, 196 bombings, 43 
kidnappings, and 170 other terrorist acts. That year there were 235 civilians killed and 
131 civilians injured by terrorist acts by this group.1  In response the Algerian 
government reportedly killed 463 terrorists, and arrested 1473 others.2  However, AQIM 
still remains.3 Additionally, AQIM’s reach extends well outside Algeria as demonstrated 
by the most prominent kidnapping of the Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler in 2009 
while in Western Niger and two French citizens in 2011 from Niamey—the capital of 
Niger. The latest statistics show an increasing frequency and effectiveness of AQIM’s 
threat outside of Algeria and suicide attacks within.4  What produced this turn of events 
and why is AQIM now on the upsurge? 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why do terrorist groups/organizations, specifically AQIM, continue to survive 
even though they are progressively less likely to meet their stated goals?  AQIM has 
failed to meet its objective to install Sharia in Algeria, it garners little popular support 
inside Algeria, and shows less prospect of reaching its goals of an Algerian Islamic state; 
yet the organization continues its campaign of terrorism. 
                                                 
1 United States Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “Algeria 2011 Crime and Safety Report: Riots/Civil 
Unrest; Crime; Terrorism,” OSAC.gov, April 21, 2011. 
https://www.osac.gov/s/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=10878 (accessed July 18, 2011),  1. 
2 Diplomatic Security, “Algeria 2011 Report,” 1. 
3 Diplomatic Security, “Algeria 2011 Report,” 3. 
4 Diplomatic Security, “Algeria 2011 Report,” and “Algeria 2012 Crime and Safety Report: Crime, 
Political Violence and Terrorism,” OSAC.gov, February 16, 2012, 
https://www.osac.gov/s/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=11999 (accessed May 19, 2012). 
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3. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on the factors that allow AQIM to continue to 
survive and operate. The focus of this thesis is primarily on the factors that influence 
AQIM’s survival. This thesis will draw on other persistent terrorist organizations, but for 
the purposes of contrast and comparison versus case studies. This scope is meant to draw 
out a few additional questions:  How might AQIM end?  What has been  the 
corresponding U.S. strategy towards AQIM and what U.S. strategy would most likely 
facilitate the end to AQIM?  These results may have implications for other persistent 
terrorist organizations worldwide, as more resources can be dedicated against other 
affiliates. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the essential factors that allow AQIM, to 
persist. An immediate goal is to allow U.S. planners to effectively target these factors 
with a U.S. counter-terrorism (CT) strategy that will be most successful against AQIM. A 
broader importance is that this sort of analysis can be used as a basis for counter-
terrorism strategies worldwide, against other persistent terrorist organizations. 
4. HISTORY 
AQIM was previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC), an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that fractured as a result of the 
loss of public support. The GSPC itself was a failing organization on the decline due to 
effective Algerian security measures. Although this organization appeared to be on a 
downward trajectory, under the AQIM banner it has managed to stabilize, and in some 
areas it is on the upswing.5 
One key question related to AQIM is, are they really a threat to the United States?  
Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, in her 2009 testimony before the Congressional Foreign 
Relations Committee, concluded. “[that AQIM and like terrorist organizations] do not 
pose a strategic threat to governments in the region.”6  At this point AQIM does not have 
                                                 
5 Diplomatic Security, “Algeria 2011 Report,” 3. 
6 Lianne Kennedy Boudali, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s 
Sahel Region,” RAND Corporation, November 17, 2009, 2. 
 3
the capability or a stated interest in directly attacking the U.S., contrary to Al-Qaeda 
(AQ) efforts to goad such activity. Furthermore, this problem is fundamentally an 
Algerian one, because AQIM has the demonstrated capability and stated goal of attacking 
Algeria. AQIM is not an immediate or direct threat to the U.S., but poses another threat to 
the U.S.. 
Again Boudali states, “In sum, AQIM has the capacity to threaten U.S. citizens 
and U.S. interests in the region.”7  This threat is resident even though AQIM, “is not in a 
position to destabilize states of the Sahel.”8 AQIM is an indirect threat to the U.S. 
through western interests in North Africa and Europe. AQIM by its affiliation and 
proximity to the illicit trade routes of the Sahel directly affects the throughput and 
terminus of illicit trafficking.   
There is a link between the criminal human, weapons, drug and material 
trafficking routes and the illicit routes terrorists use to move foreign fighters, weapons for 
the jihad and their logistics.9 The linkage allows an Algerian centric organization, AQIM, 
to influence, infiltrate, and operate well outside of its primary Area of Operations (AO). 
This makes AQIM capable of affecting a large area (from Morocco in the West to Libya 
in the East, and Nigeria in the South). As an AQ franchise organization their goals now 
include attacking western interests within the Sahel.10  Lastly, AQIM has ample 
opportunity to use the illicit routes to move operatives into Europe and affect America’s 
closest allies. This opportunity translates into an enemy operational capability. 
Though AQIM may have the ability to operate within Europe and throughout the 
Sahel, AQIM poses another threat to the west. AQIM, can influence or intercede in the 
Islamist discussion of the budding governments in North Africa. When the recent events 
of the “Arab Spring,” mature, structured organizations like AQIM can easily cross-
pollinate with the violent Islamist groups of the new nations. This likely scenario, only 
                                                 
7 Boudali, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism,” 2. 
8 Boudali, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism,” 2. 
9 Modibo Goita, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy,” 
Africa Security Brief, February 2011: 3–4. 
10 Amel Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria,” Carnegie Papers: From 
the Carnegie Middle East Center, September 2008:  9. 
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requires the pretext of government repression of the Islamist viewpoint to surge to the 
forefront and demand violent rebellion. This places the new North African governments 
in a dangerous balancing act. In their pursuit of a more democratic nation, the 
governments must avoid inciting an Islamist rebellion. The results of just such a swift 
shift to democracy led directly to the 1992 Algerian Civil War.11  America’s promotion of 
democracy in the region could be  thwarted by these Islamists who wish instead to install 
a theocracy through violence.12  Simply put, it is well within the interest of the U.S. to see 
AQIM fail. How can the U.S. ensure that the dangerous AQIM influence fails to make a 
leap into regional affairs? 
Given the threat AQIM poses, the U.S. must refine its established CT strategy 
targeting AQIM. This strategy dedicates finite resources in an attempt to counter the 
threat of AQIM. However, the U.S. is currently engaged in many campaigns against 
terrorism: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, the Horn of Africa and Yemen to name 
a few. This places AQIM’s priority as one among a myriad of threats to the U.S. Unless 
AQIM directly attacks the U.S., CT planners against AQIM are, justifiably, unlikely to 
receive priority over other more pressing threats. Additionally, the global economic crisis 
will likely further constrain resources and funding in the future. Therefore, it is a likely 
assumption that CT planners fighting AQIM are unlikely to receive all the resources that 
they request. This is why it is an absolute imperative that the CT planners find the most 
efficient and effective means to eliminate AQIM originated threats to the U.S. In the case 
of AQIM, an efficient defeat of AQIM would mean conducting a CT strategy with 
minimal resources and a high likelihood of success. This would allow, limited resources 
can be further reallocated to other emerging CT threats and foreign affairs priorities. 
AQIM does pose a threat to U.S. interests abroad. The threat of the spread of 
militant Islamism while new fragile regimes are forming is contrary to U.S. foreign 
policy goals. Lastly and most basic of all, is the need to get the U.S. CT strategy right. 
With limited resources, it is essential to find the factors that allow AQIM to persist, so 
                                                 
11 Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 1996). 
12 Barack Obama, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” NSS, 
Washington, DC: The White House, 2010, 37–38. 
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that CT planners can draft an efficient plan of attack. If this approach is successful, the 
implications are far reaching within the CT world, and can affect the U.S. approach to 
other persistent terrorist organizations. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is divided into four major chapters of research and a final chapter for 
the purposes of a conclusion and recommended way forward. The methodology for the 
thesis is to first define AQIM and determine how it has come to be. Using this historical 
context, AQIM can then be picked apart to determine its traits, weaknesses and modes of 
operation. Armed with the intricacies of the organization, tangible ends to AQIM can be 
discussed in terms of necessary conditions and the likelihood of each occurrence. By 
looking to the possible ends first, current U.S. policy can be then analyzed to determine 
where success is likely or unlikely. The final chapter brings all of the previous four 
chapters into one conclusive summary, which is used to make recommendations for a 
way ahead in U.S. policy to counter AQIM. 
 6
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II. ISLAMISM IN ALGERIA AND THE EVOLUTION TO AQIM 
A. ALGERIAN ISLAMISM 
 
Islamism13 has a long history in Algeria, but it has been marred in the past 20 
years by the deaths of 100,000 to 200,000 citizens killed in conflicts with religious 
roots.14  The notions of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalists, radical Islamists, and Muslim 
extremists within Algeria—and the world—lamentably have been lumped into one 
category, which oversimplifies the complex ideologies involved. The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold: to define the forms of Algerian Islamism, which will expose the 
complexities and varying approaches to Islamism under a secular regime; and to highlight 
a particularly sinister brand of Islamism, which will demonstrate why the specific strain 
of revolutionary Islamism brought by the GIA is so radically unique.15  This framework 
will allow for a better understanding of the current form of violent Islamism within 
Algeria as practiced by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Within this historical 
view, the recent rise of AQIM seems far less ominous as it appears to be little more than 
the GIA with a new name. 
Algerian Islamist organizations are heterogeneous, with different philosophies 
that do not fit comfortably into one order, and they represent the full spectrum of views 
                                                 
13 The terms Islamism and Islamist have different connotations, depending on the way they are used. 
Here, Islamism means the Muslim pursuit of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law. As 
demonstrated in this article, there are varying degrees through which Islamists pursue this goal, be they 
fundamentalist or moderate. The way this term is used is meant to encapsulate the full breadth of those with 
Islamist pursuits. 
14 Salima Mellah, “Justice Commission for Algeria: The Massacres in Algeria, 1992–2004,” retrieved 
from Justice Commission for Algeria website, (May 2004), http://www.algerie-
tpp.org/tpp/pdf/dossier_2_massacres.pdf (accessed August 6, 2011). 
15 The GIA would later fracture into the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which 
eventually would change its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). See Camille Tawil, 
Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi, 2010), 127, 195. 
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regarding how Islam relates to personal life and the government. Islamist groups fall into 
three broad categories, which are listed below:16 
Apolitical Islamists believe adherence to the fundamentals of Islam is a 
community or individual responsibility, and that government or political reform is not 
necessary.17  
Political Islamists believe an Islamic state is the best form of government, but 
think satisfactory Islamic governance can be achieved through political participation in a 
secular system.18  
Revolutionary Islamists believe an Islamic state must be established immediately 
and think the only way to achieve this state is through violent jihad. Their goal is to 
overthrow the government and impose their version of God’s will upon the people.19 
1. Apolitical Islamists 
The first group of individuals, the apolitical Islamists, is the most benign, and for 
the most part benevolent. These are religious people who proselytize to individuals or 
communities in an attempt to persuade people to lead morally correct lifestyles through 
the tenets of Islam. These groups can be compared to many Western Christian 
community and church organizations such as the Salvation Army20 and the Knights of 




                                                 
16 This is roughly analogous to Quintan Wiktorowicz’s purists, politicos and jihadi categories of 
Salafism in his work, “Anatonomy of the Salafi Movement,” (2006), retrieved from CÉRIUM website, 
http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy_of_the_Salafi_Movement.pdf 
(accessed September 7, 2011). 
17 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 86. 
18 Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002 (London: Verso, 2003), 100. 
19 Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 
60–62. 
20 The Salvation Army website, http://www.salvationarmyusa.org/usn/www_usn_2.nsf/vw-
local/About-us. 
21 The Knights of Columbus website, http://www.kofc.org/un/en/about/index.html. 
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not advocate for fundamental political change or a theocratic solution. Algeria has a long 
history of organizations dedicated to spiritual enlightenment and reform that are 
comparable to these Western groups.22 
The indigenous Berber population of Algeria is one example of a group based on 
enlightenment. The Berbers have maintained close ties to their long-standing Sufi 
traditions, without advocating for government intervention to enforce those traditions.23  
Abdelhamid Ben Badis is an example of an apolitical reformer. He brought about a more 
Salafist point of view and is probably the most notable leader of social reform within 
Algeria.24  Ben Badis was responsible for the formation of the Association of Algerian 
Ulama (AUMA) in May 1931.25  The AUMA specifically stated within its bylaws that 
participation in the Algerian political system was “rigorously forbidden.”26  Instead, 
AUMA advocated for reform at the community and individual level, which was similar to 
the position of a 1960s Islamist group, al-Qiyam. Unfortunately, al-Qiyam was outlawed 
by the Algerian government in 1970 as it edged closer to political Islamism.27  In recent 
years, organizations preaching Da’wa Salafism (an apolitical form of Salafism) have 
grown in popularity, primarily because it does not represent a notable threat to the 
Algerian government.28  
Apolitical Islamist groups, like the Da’wa Salafists, have traditionally sought 
educational reforms in an attempt to incorporate Islamic education into the lives of the 
                                                 
22 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 9–18. 
23 Berbers are the native inhabitants of North Africa and Algeria. They are often called “Berber 
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Salafism is most similar to Wahhabism and Arab fundamentalism. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 8–12. 
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27 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1998), 166–77. 
28 Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics,” 13–17. 
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population.29 Some reforms have been accomplished at various times in Algeria through 
the efforts of AUMA, and in the mid-1960s by Malek Bennabi.30  The promotion of 
religious education is not at all foreign to efforts seen throughout Western nations, such 
as ideas promoted by the Christian Educators Association International (CEAI).31  
Apolitical Islamists advocate for private religious education similar to the programs 
promoted by CEAI. Their efforts contrast with those of the political Islamists who 
advocate for government-controlled, public, religious education. 
2. Political Islamists 
This second group of Islamists participates and campaigns within the political 
system of the state to enact changes. This group believes an Islamic nation as dictated by 
the Quran prophetic model would be a better solution than the current secular 
government.32 Political Islamists believe incremental political change should be the 
primary method to achieve this new government, which is an important distinction 
between them and revolutionary Islamists.  
The pursuit of incremental Islamist changes has played out many times within 
Algeria. During the war of independence from France (1954–1962), Islamists were in the 
ranks of those attempting to form a new government.33 Although other parties shut out 
the Islamists following independence in 1962, the political Islamists’ ideals never 
faded.34  When a more democratic government emerged within Algeria in 1988, the 
Islamists achieved widespread public popularity.35 A 1991 Islamist political victory was 
                                                 
29 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 11. 
30 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 11–13, 57–60. 
31 Christian Educators Association International website, http://www.ceai.org/. 
32 Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 45. 
33 Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics,” 4. 
34 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 390. 
35 Democracy began to emerge in Algeria as the regime sought to maintain control during a period of 
poor economic times and high public unemployment. To solve the unrest, President Chadli Bendjedid 
proposed a series of measures to improve transparency and plurality in the government. Willis, The Islamist 
Challenge, 394. 
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thwarted by a military coup d’état that unleashed a violent civil war, but even after that, 
political Islamists still advocated for negotiation and political solutions.36 
Early forms of political Islamist groups were characterized by the Jazira trend, 
which represented the more peaceful-minded groups who advocated social and political 
movements to effect governmental change.37 The leaders who formed this group were 
some of the politically involved AUMA members who had been crowded out of the 
political process by secular groups after Algeria won independence from France.38  This 
power arrangement remained in effect until the death of President Houari Boumedienne 
in 1978, which created a power vacuum.39 His death coincided with economic woes and 
widespread desire for change within the government.40 The regime under President 
Chadli Bendjedid attempted to avert public unrest by making the government more 
transparent, democratic and allowed the participation of multiple political parties.41  This 
was a significant change for Algeria, as Algeria had basically been a one-party system 
after it had achieved independence, and the shift to a plural democracy allowed the 
previously muted Islamist voice to rise to the top.42 
The political Islamist groups during the pro-democracy period (1988–1992) were 
characterized by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), al-Harakat li-Mujtama’ Islami 
(HAMAS) and the Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya (MNI).43 The political Islamists 
formed political parties and campaigned for office in local and national elections, and 
within a short time, they had won many seats within the local and national legislatures.44  
The next bout of elections in 1991 brought an even greater victory for the Islamists, in 
                                                 
36 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 371–72. 
37 Shahin, Political Ascent, 120–21. 
38 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 35–37. 
39 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 61, 69–70. 
40 William Quandt, Between Ballots & Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 159; Shahin, Political Ascent. 
41 Shahin, Political Ascent, 127–29. 
42 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 112–13. This is akin to the Arab Spring movements of 2011. 
43 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 65. 
44 Martinez, Algerian Civil War, 20–22. 
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particular the FIS. With the political Islamists on the verge of taking a clear democratic 
majority (winning 188 of 232 seats in the first round of voting), events took a sudden turn 
away from democracy.45 
In 1992, the Algerian military orchestrated a coup by claiming the regime was 
collapsing.46  President Bendjedid was forced by the military to dissolve the National 
Assembly and resign from office.47  The military feared that the election results would 
mean “one man, one vote, but only once.”48  This prevailing anti-Islamist view feared 
that after the Islamists had won a political majority they would disassemble the 
democratic establishment to construct an Algerian theocratic system under Sharia law. 
Therefore, the coup essentially nullified the electoral victory by the Islamists. The 
political Islamist groups responded with demands to restore the constitution and the 
National Assembly, which evolved into open demonstrations and general unrest in an 
attempt to reestablish the democratic system.49  The military, reacted to demonstrations 
and some violent acts by the revolutionary Islamists groups, outlawed the Islamist 
political parties and jailed some of their leaders and followers.50 Nonetheless, even this 
severe repression did not stop the political Islamists from continuing to advocate for 
political solutions to the increasing violent struggle. 
Since 1992, organizations like the Wafa party have continued to fight through 
peaceful demonstrations and political maneuvering to re-establish an outlet for their 
Islamist views.51  The use of peaceful tactics by these groups does not mean these 
organizations never employed violence as a mechanism for change. On the contrary, 
violence was utilized by many organizations within this rubric—such as the Islamic 
                                                 
45 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 369. 
46 Shahin, Political Ascent, 149–50. 
47 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 247–50. 
48 Algeria’s Bloody Years. Directed by Malek Bensmaïl (2003, Brooklyn, NY: First Run/Icarus 
Films), VHS, 22 mins. 
49 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 253–56. 
50 Shahin, Political Ascent, 150–51. 
51 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 277. 
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Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS.52  However, such groups did not use 
violence as their primary tool to force change but as a tool to achieve political influence 
and leverage.53 
The political Islamist philosophy continues to exist in Algeria, and as late as 2002 
a resurgence of political Islamism has crept back into the Algerian political arena. The 
Movement for National Reform, a moderate Islamic party, has seen mild success, 
winning about 11% of the seats in the National Assembly.54  Political Islamists continue 
to hope for reconciliation that will resolve the long-standing conflict and allow them to 
fully participate in the Algerian government. In sharp contrast, revolutionary Islamists are 
wholly against any reconciliation or notion of working within the bounds of secular 
government.55  
3. Revolutionary Islamists 
The third form of Islamism promotes a view that Islam has an absolute 
interpretation and that the only way to achieve a nation under Islam is by violent jihad. 
Fundamentally, revolutionary Islamists believe the only solution to governance is an 
Islamic nation under Sharia. Further, they believe that any government not founded 
completely on Islamic tradition is tantamount to heresy and that the “heretics” of secular 
governments will not give up their power unless they are removed by force.56  Thus, 
revolutionary Islamists justify uncompromising actions of violent jihad to achieve their 
goal of a nation governed by Sharia. 
Such Islamist groups were initially characterized by the Algerian Islamic 
Movement (MIA), formed by Mustapha Bouyali, and later by the al-Takfir wa’Hirja.57  
After Algeria gained independence from France, these groups stockpiled weapons and 
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conducted covert warfare against the state.58  Although these Islamists groups were ever-
present, they were often termed as bandits or criminals and not seen as a substantial threat 
to the state. However, as the political situation within Algeria deteriorated, local support 
grew for revolutionary Islamists.59  This newfound popularity allowed for the birth of 
militant Islamist organizations such as the GIA and the Movement for an Islamic State 
(MEI).60 
Revolutionary Islamist organizations within Algeria took to the offensive after the 
1992 coup, striking out against the government in a series of attacks and assassinations. 
The first attack was against an army barracks on January 22, 1992, which unleashed a 
series of government reprisals, effectively intensifying the violence on both sides.61  A 
spiral of violent rebellion and repression ensued for the next five years.62  During this 
period, a competition of ideologies began within the Islamists as well.   
The political Islamists were competing with the revolutionary Islamists for 
legitimacy and public support. Groups similar to the FIS attempted to sue for peace and a 
return to politics, while organizations like the GIA and MNI63 saw no place for 
compromise and purposely sabotaged ceasefire agreements.64 The convictions of the GIA 
were so strong that its agents assassinated fellow Islamists simply for attempting to 
negotiate with the secular government.65  Additionally, the GIA assassinated fighters of a 
neighboring jihad organization, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups (LIFG) for 
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attempting to intercede.66 In effect, organizations like the GIA were not only 
disinterested in peace, they were actively preventing it from occurring. 
However, the public finally lost tolerance for the indiscriminate killing and 
withdrew support for the GIA. About the same time, the government began reconciliation 
programs to reintegrate the Islamist fighters. These two factors brought the decline of the 
GIA in the late 1990s.67  Additionally, one GIA commander who was disgusted by some 
of the group’s actions separated and formed his own organization, the GSPC in 1998.68  
Consequently, the GIA withered on the vine by the mid-2000s was no longer a major 
threat.69  The GSPC fought on against the Algerian regime but no longer waged an open 
war against the population and foreign interests.70  Though this approach was more 
tolerable, the general public was by and large done with war after witnessing the death of 
between 100,000 and 200,000 citizens during the civil war.71 This public sentiment, 
along with effective government reconciliation programs and the loss of religious support 
for the jihad, led to the steady decline in the GSPC as an effective insurgent 
organization.72  The GSPC was on the path to failure. 
Sensing a need for significant change, the leadership of the GSPC declared itself 
subservient to Al Qaeda (AQ), 73 and in 2007, the GSPC formally became Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).74  More than a name change, the transformation was 
meant to project an image of an entirely new group, and along with a new propaganda 
campaign came a return to attacks on Western targets and a rise in suicide bomb 
                                                 
66 The GIA created a long-standing grudge between the Libyan and Algerian jihad organizations, and 
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73 Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 194. 
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attacks.75  Additionally, AQIM attempted to broaden its reach as a regional threat by 
increasing fundraising, trafficking, training, and recruiting in areas of the Sahel, such as 
Mali and Niger. 
However, AQIM did not fundamentally change its strategic goals from those of 
the GSPC or GIA. Though publicized as a regional terrorist organization, AQIM showed 
“no real threat” to any regime within North Africa,76 and the fundamental goal of 
establishing an Islamic state in Algeria remained its top objective. This focus is 
evidenced within the 2010 U.S. Bureau of Diplomatic Security report, which notes that 
AQIM has continued its focus on Algeria. The report summarizes 196 bombings and 170 
other terrorist acts inside Algeria in 2010.77   In comparison, AQIM conducted a total of 
six attacks in 2010 through the beginning of 2011 across the entire Sahel (Mauritania, 
Mali and Niger).78  
 AQIM and its predecessor, the GIA, have yet to meet their objectives of 
establishing an Islamic state in Algeria through jihad, and in fact appear further from 
success since 1992. Although the public appears to desire reconciliation, AQIM  has 
continued to fight. The reason that Algerian revolutionary Islamism, in its latest form of 
AQIM, has persisted is predicated on the rise of the GIA, which is unique within the three 
forms of Algerian Islamism discussed thus far. 
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GIA AND THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF 
AQIM 
1. The Rise of the GIA 
Revolutionary Islamist groups, including the MIA and al-Takfir wa’Hirja, existed 
within Algeria well before the 1992 founding of the GIA.79  However, the GIA had a 
wholly different origin and, therefore, a different strategy to jihad. The MIA and MEI, 
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which relied on attacks against the government and its institutions, predominantly viewed 
the public, foreigners, and competing Islamists as neutral parties.80  The GIA did not, 
instead viewing all who failed to actively support its jihad as collaborators with the 
government, hence making them eligible military targets based on takfiri beliefs. Under 
the takfiri policy, the GIA slaughtered entire villages, murdered foreigners and killed 
citizens for “violating Islamic law,” with executions carried out for infractions ranging 
from infidelity to wearing Western clothing.81  In this way, the ideas of the GIA 
essentially differed from those of other Algerian, revolutionary Islamist organizations. 
The major difference in ideology arose during the Soviet-Afghan War, which 
exposed between 1,200 to 2,000 Algerian fighters who served in the conflict to the hard-
liner precepts of Arab Islamism.82  The Algerian-Afghans (as they became known) were 
particularly exposed to the ideology of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden.83  
These Algerian fighters trained in the Pakistani camps set up by the Arab and Egyptian 
mujahedeen, and there, some members were indoctrinated while others were simply 
exposed to the more revolutionary ideas of the mujahedeen.84  One Afghan-Algerian 
mujahidin, Qari Said al-Jazairi, served as an AQ facilitator and messenger and would 
later be influential in establishing the GIA with AQ startup money and recruiting.85  
Thus, Algerian-Afghan veterans like Qari Said imported their ideas from the future 
leadership of AQ. 
AQ played an instrumental part to the formation of the GIA; however, 
responsibility for the carnage of the Algerian Civil War does not rest solely on Al Qaeda. 
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AQ leaders certainly had a hand in the war, but it was by no means all their doing. In the 
beginning, the few Algerian-Afghan veterans brought inspiration, leadership, 
professional fighting skills, organization, and determination with them to Algeria. But as 
the GIA evolved, Algerians who had not served in Afghanistan became its primary 
constituents. These GIA members more than likely were former members of the FIS, 
MIA, or other Algerian Islamist organizations. As AQ formed in Sudan, it played a role 
as a GIA sponsor, providing funding, training and support; and reports from before 2001 
that highlight the open support coming from Sudan to the GIA may allude to the genesis 
of AQ in Sudan.86  Ultimately, however, as referenced by Wright in The Looming Tower, 
the GIA acted on its own to reach levels of violence well beyond the scope of what AQ 
had intended, which eventually caused a cooling of relations between the two groups.87 
By the time Djamel Zitouni took over the GIA in 1995, he had completely 
incorporated the principles of takfiri violence.88 Zitouni had condemned the entire society 
of Algeria and any foreign influence. “The Butcher,” as he became known, lashed out at 
all outside his organization. His successor, Antar Zwabri, went even further and was 
responsible for the worst massacres of the entire conflict.89  In retrospect, the GIA was a 
spawn of AQ ideology that received its baptism under fire in Algeria as Algerians in the 
GIA simply ran with the ideological beliefs, taking them to an extreme end. The GIA 
village massacres of 1997 and 1998 precipitated the eventual split to the GSPC.90 
                                                 
86 The following sources, writing before 2001, all mention the support from groups within Sudan, 
when Al Qaeda was a much lesser-known entity. Therefore, these authors most likely would have been 
unaware of the significance of Islamist aide coming from Sudan and noted it merely as an Islamist ally like 
Iran: Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 378; Quandt, Ballots & Bullets, 97, 154; Martinez, Algerian Civil 
War, 21. Martinez goes so far as to mention the notion of takfir originating from Egyptian values from the 
affiliation with the Afghanistan mujahedeen. After 2001, when reading these texts, the link between AQ in 
Sudan and the Algerian jihad is seen clearly. The fledgling AQ organization, in its first operational test, 
sent operatives to Algeria, according to Wright, The Looming Tower, 142, 216; and Tawil, Brothers in 
Arms, 96. 
87  Wright, The Looming Tower 215–17. 
88 Zitouni had actually been a butcher by trade, and this reference stuck as he increased the GIA’s 
level of violence against the populace. Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 127–29. 
89 Zwabri was credited with massacres of entire villages, killing 400 or more unarmed citizens. He 
was also the GIA leader who ordered the murder of the LIFG fighters. Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 129. 
90 Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 127. 
 19
2. The Al-Qaeda Connection and Takfiri Violence 
In 2001, AQ sent an emissary to meet with Hattab, the leader of the GSPC, in an 
attempt to influence the new revolutionary Islamist leader in Algeria. However, the 
emissary was killed by Algerian security forces, providing further proof that AQ was 
actively courting the Algerian jihad.91  The 2003 allegiance to Osama bin Laden and the 
subsequent 2006 merger of AQ and the GSPC, announced by Ayman al-Zawahiri, were 
no surprise.92  The reality is that Al-Qaeda had always been in Algeria.93  With this 
historical perspective, AQIM does not appear to be a brand-new organization, formed as 
a new AQ front to the global jihad. Instead, AQ formally and informally sponsored the 
Algerian jihad with ideology, training, and financing for more than 15 years and had a 
part in the GIA, although it could not control it. In this context, the arrival of AQIM on 
the Algerian Islamist stage seems far less significant and can be seen as more of a rebirth 
of the GIA than anything else—an attempt to restart the engine of takfiri jihad begun by 
Afghan veterans like Qari Said. From this point of view, the rise of the GIA was more a 
important and dangerous event. 
Prior to the formation of the GIA, Algeria had not experienced the indiscriminate 
types of violence that became routine under the group, which introduced two forms of 
violence: the murder of civilians in the name of takfir and the killing of foreigners. The 
concept of murder of noncombatants under takfir was justified by a GIA fatwa, which 
declared, “the populace should pick sides [either the state or the jihad] on pain of 
death.”94 The fatwa meant the GIA was no longer satisfied with neutral parties or tacit 
support but would view citizens as either with the GIA or against it. The extermination of 
entire villages became a common practice after this fatwa was issued.95 
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The takfiri fatwa also applied to all foreigners and foreign institutions.96  One 
example of the GIA acting upon this tenet was the hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 in 
1994, with the intent to crash the fuel-laden airliner in Paris, a predecessor to the 9/11 
plot carried out in the United States.97  Another example was the murder of seven French 
monks in Algeria.98  These types of events were not prevalent prior to the rise of the GIA, 
and the only substantially new tactic brought by AQIM was the use of suicide 
bombings.99  Overall, AQIM of today seems little changed from the GIA of the late 
1990s. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
While the GIA provided a significant transformation of revolutionary Islamism in 
the country, AQIM can be seen as just another part of Algeria’s long history of Islamism. 
Furthermore, Islamist ideals have never been homogenous but instead vary widely from 
individual spiritual salvation to the use of violent jihad to force compliance with the 
tenets of Islam. These principles can be explained broadly in the terms of apolitical, 
political, and revolutionary Islamist divisions. Grouping Islamists into these categories 
makes it easy to see how revolutionary Islamists differ from the rest. Even within the 
revolutionary Islamist groups of Algeria, the GIA was a clear aberration, representing 
something novel from traditional Algerian Islamism. The difference grew from the 
experiences of a few Algerian fighters as mujahedeen in the Afghan jihad combined with 
the subsequent influence by the future founders of Al Qaeda. However, because AQ has 
maintained a close relationship with the Algerian jihad throughout; the birth of AQIM 
can be seen as a fundamentally trivial evolution. In fact, AQIM appears to be an attempt 
to return to the GIA, the original Algerian jihad group of 1992. Essentially, AQIM is less 
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of an instrumental transformation in Islamist ideology than an insignificant name change 
in a chapter of Algeria’s Islamist history—a history of spiritual tradition, political reform, 
and unrestrained violence. 
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III. AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB: 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF 
OPERATION 
AQIM is the latest evolution of an Algerian terrorist jihad that spans two decades. 
AQIM’s initial predecessor organization was the GIA. The GIA, through its 
indiscriminate use of violence lost favor with the populace, and subsequently 
fractured.100  From this fracture was born the Group for Salafist Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC). The GSPC did not fare much better than the GIA, because of effective Algerian 
reconciliation and repression efforts.101  In an effort to survive, the GSPC instituted a 
form of “institutional imitation” to compensate for their lack of success in the changing 
operational environment.102  With AQIM’s case, they used this imitation to both rally 
local support and infuse some international clout and legitimacy to their cause by 
imitating a successful jihad organization, Al-Qaeda.103  To renew the Algerian jihad, the 
GSPC aligned with Al-Qaeda, and eventually adopted the AQIM title.104 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s name change asserted an international stature 
for the previously domestic jihad. Though the former goals of establishing an Islamic 
state in Algeria remained; internationalist goals such as attacking foreigners, supporting 
other Al-Qaeda jihads and expanding regional control and influence also became AQIM 
priorities.105  Along with these new goals, AQIM implemented Al-Qaeda tactics 
previously unseen in Algeria. These tactics included suicide bombings and a dramatic 
increase in bombings as a form of engaging security forces (as opposed to small arms 
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engagements).106  However, despite the new list of priorities and tactics AQIM is still 
primarily focused on Algeria.107  This Algerian focus can be seen in AQIM’s structure 
and organization. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AQIM 
Like AQIM’s focus, few structural changes have occurred from those of the 
GSPC. Fundamentally the headquarters and leadership structure of AQIM has remained 
unchanged.108  The primary composition of the leadership has remained predominantly 
Algerian, and all were previous fighters in the GIA or GSPC.109  However, AQIM has 
made a few changes to its structure. The previous nine zone structure has been 
consolidated into four (Central, East, West and South).110 Further these zones of 
operation have been expanded as far as operationally feasible outside the borders of 
Algeria. These changes rely primarily on the personalities and the tactical situation of 
each zone leader experiences. 
The structure of AQIM’s headquarters and leadership has remained unchanged. 
Comparing AQIM’s current structure (Figure 1)111 with Anneli Botha’s 2007 structure of 
the GSPC (Figure 2)112 the same fundamental headquarters structure is readily apparent. 
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AQIM is headed by the Supreme Commander, Abdelmalek Droukdel.113 Though 
Droukdel has overall command of AQIM, the leadership includes a council of People of 
Authority.114 The People of Authority are divided into two councils:  the Council of 
Notables and a Shura Council. The Council of Notables is made of senior ranking AQIM 
members that function similar to a war council or military staff.115  The Shura Council’s 
purpose is to provide legal and religious advice and legitimacy to AQIM.116  Subordinate 
commanders in AQIM are designated as Emirs who control the zones, brigades, 
battalions and groups.117  This structure has not changed with the AQIM moniker. 
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Figure 1.   AQIM’s Current Structure 
 
A depiction of AQIM’s structure, by the author, based on Jane’s Defense and various 
sources. The depiction is an incomplete work, given the constantly changing leaders, and 
represents the open source information available to the author at the time. Incomplete 
information is denoted by “UNK.”118  
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Figure 2.   GSPC Structure 
 
A copy of Anneli Botha’s GSPC structure from her 2007 monograph.119 
 
                                                 
119 Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb, 41. 
 28
Likewise, the composition of AQIM’s leadership has remained predominantly 
Algerian. The Supreme Commander, the entire Shura Council, Council of Notables and 
almost all the regional and local Emirs are Algerian.120  Furthermore all of the leaders are 
veterans of the GSPC or GIA. Droukdel was the  former commander of Jerusalem 
Brigade of the GIA, a member of the GSPC’s Council of Notables and finally took 
command of the GSPC in 2004.121  Mokhtar Belmokhtar, led the Martyrdom brigade of 
the GIA, zone nine of the GSPC and remains a subordinate commander in AQIM’s 
southern zone.122  Abdelhamid Zeid, a commander in charge of AQIM groups in the east 
and southern zones, moved some of his forces from northeast Algeria to the Sahel; rather 
than create a new command composed of Sahelians.123  These zones mark the basic 
changes that AQIM has made since its days as the GSPC. 
AQIM’s four zones of operation are the Central, East, West and South, as 
depicted in Figure 3.124  The central zone contains the Algerian capital and the main 
urban centers of Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou surrounding Algiers.125  The eastern zone 
begins roughly east of Tizi Ouzou and including much of the mountainous forested areas 
that border Tunisia, but not into the Sahara desert.126  The south zone includes the vast 
area of the Sahara dropping from the central zone, abutting Libya and into the nations of 
Niger, Mauritania and Mali.127  The West zone begins roughly west of Medea province 
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including the urban hub of Oran and into Morocco.128  The naming convention of the 
zones has changed to cardinal direction versus numerical naming, as has the scope of 
each zone. 
AQIM’s zones of operation have been pushed well outside the borders of Algeria, 
and reflect a change in strategy. The Southern zone, long a supporting zone for 
smuggling and logistics, has become more involved in tactical operations due to 
necessity.129  Algerian security forces have generally pushed AQIM into the Kabiyle 
Mountains and the wastelands of northern Mali.130  With the South zone’s 2011 attacks 
in Mali, 2010 in Mauritania and the 2009 kidnapping of Canadian Ambassador Robert 
Fowler in Niger contributing to a sense of AQIM as regional and international terrorist 
organization.131  Operations in the East and West zones have likewise attempted to 
expand into neighboring nations, but were met with stiff resistance. AQIM’s expansion 
into new areas is facilitated by the way in which they conduct operations.  
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Figure 3.   AQIM Zones of Operation 
 
A map roughly outlining the new AQIM zones based on Jane’s Defense.132 
 
B. AQIM’S METHODS OF OPERATION 
AQIM conducts operations with centralized command and decentralized 
execution. The centralized command structure of the headquarters element (Supreme 
commander, Council of Notables and Shura Council) task or approve targets and 
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campaign plans for the zone commanders.133  Zone commanders and Emirs are given 
latitude within their areas’ to execute their operations as they see fit.134  The operational 
areas and zones of the Emirs are not fixed, but overlap and change according to the 
operational requirements.135  The size and shape of operational areas depend more on 
commander’s capabilities and relationship with fellow AQIM leaders, than boundaries. It 
is therefore feasible that an Emir from the Western zone could conduct an attack in the 
South zone without having to defer to any leadership other than the South zone emir. This 
allows AQIM to execute decentralized operations and seize opportunities more readily. 
Another reason for the loose boundaries is that subordinate commanders are 
expected to be self-sufficient. Each Emir is expected to provide their own financing, 
weapons and recruits.   The ability to cross boundaries and operate freely is essential to 
the survival of each subordinate. In effect, each subordinate group has its own cellular 
structure and is self-contained.136  By doing this, AQIM has relegated the tough issue of 
centralized logistics and financing to the many semi-autonomous units below. The 
headquarters element is free to provide campaign guidance, and where necessary, provide 
key logistical support for high-priority operations. 
AQIM’s operations cover the full gamut of insurgent operations. However, the 
majority of AQIM’s attacks are bombings and kidnappings. AQIM conducted 43 
kidnappings for ransom in Algeria alone in 2010137 and another 19 in 2011.138  
Kidnapping for ransom is likely a means of generating revenue as each cell is responsible 
for their own sustainment, through simple burglaries, extortion and Zakat. Kidnapping 
operations, in particular, have netted millions of Euro’s for AQIM. Additionally, the 
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organization has also conducted many bombings, with 196 bombings in 2010.139  These 
bombings mostly targeted security forces and components of the government in Algeria; 
however, AQIM also targeted foreigners and civilians.140 Beyond bombings and 
kidnappings, AQIM conducts raids on security forces, smuggling across Africa, into 
Europe and is involved in the drug trade.141  AQIM also provides a means for foreign 
fighters to enter Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to support AQ’s global jihad.142  
Despite intense security pressure and the foreboding elements of the Sahara, AQIM has 
carved out an effective existence in the Sahara. 
With decentralized operations spread over Algeria and beyond, certain factors are 
required to keep AQIM operationally viable. AQIM’s leadership is a factor with its 
effective, dedicated leaders. These leaders operate in a semi-independent cellular fashion, 
contributing greatly to AQIM’s survivability. Criminality is a primary driver to the cells 
success, as it is the source of self-sustainment. By being self-sufficient AQIM cells are 
free to expand their operations into new areas and draw upon both regional and 
international opportunities. The international flavor of AQIM, provided by central Al-
Qaeda, offer the propaganda and media attention necessary to provide broader legitimacy 
to AQIM. These factors essentially have given AQIM a new lease on life. 
As with the GSPC, AQIM’s survival is often in question due to effective 
leadership targeting of counter-terrorism forces; however, since the 2007 transition 
AQIM’s leadership has remained resilient. Regardless of repeated Algerian security 
successes against AQIM leadership, the independent groups continue to operate. In the 
cases of Droukdel and Belmokhtar, both leaders have evaded capture or death for the full 
two decade long conflict. This factor allows AQIM to have some interesting attributes, 
the ability to be both centralized and decentralized. 
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AQIM has taken the traits of both centralized and decentralized leadership. In Ori 
Brafman’s The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable power of Leaderless 
Organizations, he discusses a notion of a “sweet spot” for an optimal hybrid of 
centralization and decentralization.143  “The decentralized sweet spot is the point along 
the centralized-decentralized continuum that yields the best competitive position.”144  In 
this case subordinate leaders are free to use their initiative and seize opportunity without 
overly obstructive meddling from the headquarters. The headquarters provides the 
continuity by nudging the zone commanders in one direction or another and approving 
bottom-up operations. This is not to say that AQIM has found nor continually holds the 
elusive sweet spot. On the contrary, AQIM has many internal disputes concerning the 
direction of the organization and leadership decisions.145  These fissures have been a part 
of AQIM’s evolution from the GIA to the  GSPC, and the GSPC until now. 
AQIM’s continued operations rely on a cellular structure. This factor makes 
AQIM much more of a “starfish” organization, or an organization that if divided forms 
into multiple organizations instead of dying like a spider.146  The self-sufficient groups 
are capable of independent operations that can potentially complement each other. In this 
way even though a provincial cell is suppressed by security forces, a neighboring cell can 
continue the operations of the suppressed cell within that province. This has two effects: 
the illusion of an irrepressible cell and to create a diversion to allow the pressured cell to 
recover.   
When an AQIM cell is cut off from the leadership it is not prone to die, but 
continues on independently. Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group is an example of this in action. 
Belmokhtar, who had lost favor with the leadership of AQIM, specifically Droukdel, has 
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operated semi-independently for years in the deserts of the Sahara.147  The 
Moulathamoun group under Belmokhtar’s leadership has only grown operationally with 
its isolation.148  The concept of independent cells that are self-sufficient requires a 
mechanism to provide recruits, finances and mobility. 
The criminal nature of the cells provides the required mechanism for self-
sustainment. Many of the cells are composed of former criminals or bandits with a long 
criminal history outside of jihad. Further using their experiences in criminality, AQIM 
can take advantage of the smuggling networks for the purposes of moving people, 
equipment and self-financing. Another source of AQIM income is hostage taking for 
ransom. Smuggling, ransoms and AQIM’s involvement in the drug trade have buoyed 
AQIM’s financial stability. These criminal activities offer a unique characteristic to 
AQIM’s self-sustainment. 
One interesting characteristic of AQIM’s recruit base, is the proclivity for AQIM 
members to have criminal records in petty crime and drug trafficking. Following the mass 
arrests of the 1992 Algerian coup, prisoners confined to Saharan prison camps became 
radicalized.149  Though these prisoners were not imprisoned for common criminality, 
they were allowed to intermingle with common criminals which set the precedent for 
future radicalization of prisoners. For example, an inordinate number AQIM’s suicide 
bombers had served previous prison terms for crimes unrelated to AQIM or the jihad 
(drugs and petty crime).150  Additionally, jihad leaders like Belmokhtar were more 
commonly known for their abilities to smuggle illicit trade rather than wage jihad.151   
The ability to smuggle goods facilitates AQIM’s transportation network and 
finances their operations. One case is Belmokhtar, who was specifically known for his 
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successes in the illegal cigarette trade.152  This smuggling route not only reaches east-
west along the Sahara, but north-south into Europe. The operational utility provides both 
richer financial rewards for the illicit European trade and the ability to project operations 
into Europe. The criminal connection between AQIM and Europe is further enhanced by 
kidnap for ransom operations. 
With the blessing from the AQIM headquarters, European hostages are taken for 
high ransoms. Taking European hostages for ransom has become a lucrative business for 
AQIM netting about 12 million Euros in 2009–2010 alone.153  Though hostage taking has 
become a priority, the majority of hostages taken for ransom has remained Algerians for 
local ransom.154 International mass media attention focuses almost exclusively on the 
few European hostages taken each year by AQIM, with little mention of the tenfold 
number of Algerian hostages in the same time period. AQIM has further financial 
connections in Europe through the drug trade. 
AQIM has recently become involved in the European drug trade.155  This trade 
has ties to South America and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
Increasingly internationalized, the FARC has expanded their drug operations into 
Europe.156  The FARC have begun using AQIM’s illicit smuggling routes and security 
forces to transport their drugs.157  The extent of the involvement or reliance on drugs for 
AQIM financing is unclear, but drugs are another criminal factor that allows AQIM to 
project their internationality. 
AQIM’s expansion to regional and international operations have provided 
renewed vigor for the organization. With the new operational areas has come new 
opportunities to exploit weak states. Specifically, the expanded Southern and Western 
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zones enjoy more freedom of operation outside the pressure of Algerian security forces 
than the Eastern and Central zones.158 Algerian security efforts have focused on denial of 
the urban areas of Algeria to AQIM, and isolation into the depopulated Sahara. The 
AQIM response is akin to a balloon being squeezed, they moved some of their operations 
outside the security pressure and into the Sahelian region.159 However, instead of 
withering, AQIM has adapted and found ways to persevere. The relative lack of security 
pressure in the Sahel areas, and tribal nature of the population have made the location 
amenable to supporting AQIM cells.160 However, this move does have significant 
disadvantages. 
By expanding into regional affairs, AQIM has exposed itself to more 
opportunities, but simultaneously increased risk to multi-national security forces. AQIM 
has invited increased security cooperation with Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Mali 
with its regional expansion.161 Additionally, the fundamental goal of achieving an 
Islamic state in Algeria through jihad is now further from AQIM’s grasp. Though 
AQIM’s cells have become increasingly isolated from the urban areas of Algeria, they 
were still capable of conducting 366 attacks in the most northern parts of Algeria in 
2010.162  AQIM not only has the ability to project power regionally, but internationally. 
AQIM has long supported operations in Europe and AQ’s global jihad. AQIM’s 
networks were responsible for attacks in Europe following the United States September 
11th attacks.163  Similar networks were also responsible for the movement of Algerian 
foreign fighters into Iraq and Afghanistan.164  As of 2007, in Iraq, Algerians made up 
over 20% of the total foreign fighter population coming from North Africa.165 
Additionally, twenty-four Algerians were still being held in U.S. custody at Guantanamo 
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Bay, as 2007.166  These international networks provide a boost to AQIM’s credibility as 
an international organization, and aid in recruiting. 
Another important factor to lend to AQIM’s credibility is by being an Al-Qaeda 
affiliate. By receiving the AQIM moniker they appear as a wholly new organization with 
global jihad aspirations.167  Al-Qaeda’s global propaganda machine further drive this 
message across with direct blessings from the senior Al-Qaeda leadership.168 The 
purpose is not necessarily to garner international support to the Algerian jihad, but to be 
“local[ly]... backed by international rhetoric.”169  Becoming an Al-Qaeda affiliate does 
have its risks. AQIM has provoked international security pressure by declaring itself a 
member of the global jihad, in spite of their localized Algerian cause.170  International 
security pressure does have a positive backlash,  specifically, increased U.S. and French 
involvement in the Algerian jihad validates AQIM’s credentials as a legitimate 
international threat.171  Fundamentally, AQIM has changed the message that jihad is the 
only way to establish an Islamic Algeria, to a counter-Crusader jihad. The change in 
message has contributed to AQIM’s viability and renewed their cause. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
AQIM is operationally viable due to its structure and methods it uses to operate. 
The structure of AQIM is founded on the GSPC framework, a structure with a Supreme 
Commander, Council of Notables and Shura Council for the purposes of decision 
making, strategy and legitimacy. Below the headquarters, AQIM’s Emirs conduct 
operations within four zones semi-autonomously. The zones and boundaries are not rigid, 
giving Emirs the freedom to snatch opportunities as they become available. This structure 
alone is a significant contributing factor to AQIM’s success as a persistent organization. 
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AQIM’s centralized command with decentralized execution provide another 
reason for AQIM’s overall resilience. Semi-independent AQIM leaders are free to 
exercise control over their areas preventing over-reliance on senior leadership. The semi-
autonomous nature of the groups or cells requires criminal networks as a mechanism for 
logistics and funding. These criminal networks overlap with terrorist networks and routes 
to allow AQIM to expand or project into new areas and affect the region. AQIM’s 
sponsor organization (AQ) provides the international legitimacy and credentials to 
expand its operations and bolster recruiting. These factors are not invulnerable, but have 
their weaknesses. 
AQIM’s structure and operations are imperfect. Its structure has not 
fundamentally changed since the change from the GSPC, meaning that it may not be 
postured to conduct global jihad operations.172  At the tactical level AQIM is effective, 
however, at the strategic level, AQIM is far less likely of achieving its primary objective 
of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria. By insisting on this objective, AQIM is in 
effect limiting itself in what it could achieve in a regional context. Regionally, without 
significant non-Algerian leadership, AQIM will continue to miss opportunities for 
collaboration and the potential to spread its influence. Further, given the decentralized 
nature of AQIM’s cells they have limited their ability to make drastic, timely changes 
from the top. Therefore, AQIM is capable of surviving and operating, but not of 
achieving any real strategic aim beyond persistence. 
The internal process of AQIM is also not in perfect harmony, as the internal and 
external conflicts between its members have made its effectiveness debatable. Leadership 
in AQIM must be appointed by the Shura Council; however the succession of command 
has rarely been peaceful, often deferring to the more ruthless leader. In-fighting has 
marred the organization from its inception and has been the source of three subsequent 
divisions leading to AQIM. AQIM’s divisiveness has boiled over to its relations with 
neighboring jihad organizations and potential allies. In the days of the GIA, GIA’s 
leaders had reprimanded Osama Bin Laden for “meddling” in Algerian affairs173 and 
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were later responsible for the murder of members of the LIFG.174  This xenophobia 
prevents non-Algerian members from ascending to leadership roles in the organization. 
AQIM maintains an Algerian leadership, while using a diverse operating core 
from other countries at the bottom level of the organization. In effect, AQIM has hobbled 
its own international character, relegating itself to being primarily a regional, if not 
purely Algerian organization. The major block to change is the Shura Council. AQIM’s 
Shura Council, composed entirely of Algerians (in most cases Northern Algerians) elects 
the leadership of AQIM, hence the Algerian focus. By failing to diversify the Shura 
Council, AQIM is unable to fully take advantage of emerging opportunities that are 
outside of an Algerian context, and provide the driver for Algerian centric goals and 
objectives. 
AQIM has not truly accepted its international role; its xenophobic activities have 
alienated and isolated it from other potential allies in the fight against secular influence in 
the region. When Droukdel changed his organization from the GSPC to AQIM (taking a 
large regional name), the LIFG pledged a separate allegiance to Al-Qaeda just to make it 
clear that they did not fall under AQIM.175  This expresses the divisive nature of AQIM, 
and its real effect has left AQIM out of Libya’s Arab Spring. AQIM must instead seek 
coalitions and cooperation between the many jihad organizations within North Africa to 
see any appreciable viability to it as a regional organization with international influence. 
Without significant reconciliation efforts on the part of AQIM with peer organizations it 
will remain consolidated in the relatively benign portion of the Sahara desert and be no 
more likely of producing success in the urbanized areas of Algeria. Fundamentally, for 
AQIM to survive it must continue to evolve and change both its structure and objectives 
to prosper beyond mere survival to see any chances of its regional objectives being met. 
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IV. HOW COULD AQIM END? 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
Most all organizations come to an end, even more the case for terrorist 
organizations. With a full ninety percent of terrorist organizations ending in their first 
years after formation, terrorist organizations tend to be short lived phenomena.176  
However, terrorist organizations with strong racial and cultural ties like AQIM, the latest 
evolution of an Algerian insurgent/terrorist organization established in 2007, appear to 
endure. As Audrey Cronin and Martha Crenshaw posit, terrorist groups’ perseverance is 
likely related to their ability to maintain local support, which requires the terrorist 
organization to be fundamentally homogenous with the population.177  Given AQIM’s 
pure Algerian leadership this gives a sense to why AQIM, as a twenty-year running 
Algerian insurgent/terrorist organization with roots in the GIA of the early 90s, has 
persisted.178  Historically though, even culturally based terrorist organizations have come 
to an eventual end. 
This chapter will discuss the possible ends to terrorism as summarized by Audrey 
Kurth Cronin’s “How al-Qaida Ends.” Cronin uses seven “critical elements” which have 
precipitated the end to previous terrorist organizations throughout history.179  Further, her 
format is readily familiar to most counterterrorism scholars and experts, and provides a 
suitable layout to discuss AQIM’s ultimate end. The intent of this chapter is not to 
recreate or re-write Cronin’s work, but to simply use her shell to input the unique 
attributes and environmental factors that are relevant to AQIM. Though all seven 
elements will be discussed individually, the purpose is to determine which combination 
of elements are likely to lead to AQIM’s demise, as few terrorist organizations have 
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ended on one factor alone.180  Ultimately, these end game scenarios are to be paired up 
with a suggested counterterrorism strategy to encourage and facilitate AQIM’s downfall. 
B. POSSIBLE ENDS TO AQIM 
Cronin’s seven critical elements are the framework for this chapter.181  The first 
of which is the capture or killing of the leader. Second, is the inability to pass the cause to 
the next generation. The third element is the achievement of the terrorist’s cause. 
Similarly, the fourth element is a transition to a legitimate political process. The fifth 
element is the loss of popular support. Repressive measures by the state is the sixth 
element. And the final element is the terrorist organization’s transition to other forms of 
violence. These elements constitute the majority of reasons why terrorist organizations 
cease. Each element will be discussed as what this particular end would look like for 
AQIM. 
1. Capture or Killing the Leadership 
The capture or killing of a terrorist leader is the most straight-forward 
counterterrorism strategy. This tactic is usually effective particularly on organizations 
that have a substantial hierarchy or rely on a charismatic leader.182  If these leaders were 
sufficiently necessary to the organization’s continued existence, the organization will 
typically collapse. This element speaks specifically to the demoralization or chaos created 
in the wake of such a decapitation, which starts the decline of the organization. In 
AQIM’s case, decapitation would require targeting Abdelmalek Droukdel, members of 
AQIM’s Council of Notables or those on AQIM’s Shura council. 
a. Targeting Droukdel, the Supreme Commander of AQIM 
Adbelmalek Droukdel, the Supreme Commander of AQIM, has a long 
legacy in the Algerian jihad. Droukdel’s formative years were at the center of the popular 
Algerian Islamist movement in the 1990s. His education and experience allowed him to 
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climb the ranks of the Algerian jihad, by proving his worth and commitment. As he rose 
to command the GSPC, he sought to expand its reach and relevance, tying the GSPC to 
Al-Qaeda’s global jihad.183  This same drive to make AQIM part of a larger cause is also 
present in Droukdel’s centralized leadership style; making him both an effective part of 
AQIM’s leadership, and a vulnerability to the organization if lost. 
Droukdel appears to be more of an empire builder than a coalition builder 
within AQIM. This was made clear during his 2008 New York Times interview. While he 
espoused unity in the jihad he emphasized AQIM’s efforts tied to the bigger jihad, 
claimed a multi-ethnic constituency for AQIM; yet, he conspicuously omitted any claim 
of unity with the many other jihad organizations of the Maghreb.184  Contrary to 
Droukdel’s claim the leadership of AQIM has remained Algerian, in spite of  the seven 
year emphasis on international terrorism.185  Further, Droukdel has not been able to ally 
his cause with those of the Moroccan Islamic Group (GICM) or the LIFG. Droukdel 
changed his organization from the GSPC to AQIM to take a on large regional name to 
subsume the area that other organization with little return. Instead Droukdel’s efforts 
seem to have had more internal implications. 
Within AQIM, Droukdel has been primarily concerned with internal 
power struggles. The most well-known is the dispute between himself and Mohktar 
Belmohktar (MBM), a popular AQIM sub-commander in the southern region of the 
GSPC, who voiced his displeasure with Droukdel’s climb to power and subsequent 
expansion of operations into the Sahel.186   MBM was promptly demoted from his post as 
the Southern regional commander and a close ally to Droukdel was appointed as the new 
regional commander (Yahia Djoudai).187  Droukdel then sent one of his many brigades 
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(AQIM currently operates about 10 brigades or fighting units)188 from Northeastern 
Algeria, led by Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, to commence Droukdel’s campaign in the 
Sahel.189  The result of which has caused the two commanders, MBM and Zeid to 
compete ruthlessly for resources and prove their worth to AQIM. 
A less well known dispute is with the Shura Council. AQIM’s leadership 
is composed of the Supreme Commander (Droukdel) and “the People of Authority.”190  
The People of Authority are made up of two councils, the Council of Notables and the 
Shura Council. The Council of Notables is analogous to the Council of Elders, made up 
primarily of the senior commanders of AQIM. The Shura Council is composed of the 
religious elders, who provide the religious legitimacy for the organization. In March 
2010, the Shura Council leader of AQIM released a video making contrary statements to 
that of Droukdel. This seemed to corroborate the claim that Droukdel had begun 
deferring to AQ-Central for its guidance, minimizing the role of AQIM’s own Shura 
Council.191  Droukdel has attempted to make himself the central link to AQIM and its 
global legitimacy. 
As the Supreme Commander of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel is a high 
value target for counter-AQIM forces. Though, in the past, the Algerian jihadists have 
shown a great deal of resilience in the face of leadership targeting, Droukdel’s long term 
as commander has made him more essential to the organization. He has been in charge of 
the organization since 2003, as the GSPC, and is now the longest serving leader in 
Algerian jihad history since 1992. Further, Droukdel is the primary link between AQ and 
AQIM, severing that link would have a pronounced impact. 
The impact of Droukdel’s death would be immediate. A meeting of the 
Council of Notables would be convened to establish a working leadership until a 
successor could be found. It is also reasonable to assume that those on the Council of 
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Notables would also start jockeying for the key position themselves. The ultimate 
decision would be made by the Shura council, which would serve not only as the electing 
body, but as the religious authority for the successor to assume the position of Supreme 
Commander. Though this seems relatively clear-cut, succession has failed to be an 
uncontested matter in the Algerian jihads. There will likely be turmoil, infighting and 
even internal “house-cleaning” after the succession. Due in particular to Droukdel’s 
hunger for power and ruthless command, his rivals will have waited for quite some time 
to see him deposed.  
b. Targeting the Council of Notables, AQIM’s War Council  
The Council of Notables serves as the war council or the group of 
respected leaders who are brought together to make both tactical and strategic decisions 
for the organization. This council is primarily composed of the zone commanders, key 
staff and prominent emirs throughout the organization.192 In effect, they are the likely 
contenders for succession in the organization and are the commanders of cells or groups 
of cells in the organization. The council represents the key people of AQIM and if 
targeted, a significant vulnerability.  
Some of the members of the Council of Notables are highly important in 
the short term viability of the organization and may have long-term implications. An 
example would be to target the Southern Zone emirs:  Nabil Makloufi, Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Zeid. Makloufi is the new emir over the southern zone, sent 
specifically to quell the rivalry between Belmokhtar and Zeid.193  His dispatch would 
certainly disrupt operations and acerbate the tension between the two emirs, until a 
suitable replacement could be found. Belmokhtar is a long time veteran of the Sahara, 
where he has served since 1992, the removal of Belmokhtar would have an immediate 
effect and effectively hamper half of the operating forces in the Sahara. Likewise, Zeid’s 
capture or death would leave his force equally adrift. By effectively targeting at least two 
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of these three emirs, the southern zone would be greatly hampered and internal strife 
would likely reign requiring intervention from the Algerian-based leadership of AQIM. 
The seriousness of just such an attack on AQIM, could temporarily cripple one of 
AQIM’s primary sources of income and their smuggling routes. Both of which are 
essential to AQIM’s survival. In the long-term, this setback and loss in expertise could 
severely degrade the ability regain the initiative in the south. 
c. Targeting the Shura Council 
The Shura or religious council serves as the legitimizing force of AQIM. 
Without the Shura council AQIM loses its primary pillar that is the foundation to its 
organization. Though AQIM has a great deal of tactical leaders and is operationally 
focused, their goals are religious in nature. Therefore, a religious leadership is essential to 
give the requisite validation for their actions in keeping with their views of Islam. 
Functionally, AQIM does not require the Shura council, but to hold any clout for 
recruiting, funding and general popular support the Shura council is vital. 
Targeting the Shura council is extremely difficult. First, the Shura council 
is highly secretive, and few members are publically known.194  Second, these figures are 
religious leaders who rarely take part in tactical operations. Therefore, the opportunity to 
discover and remove these leaders is not an easy task. However, if security forces were to 
discover the members of the council this would represent a great blow to the 
organization. Not only does the Shura council aide in decision making and give validity 
to AQIM’s cause, but they are also central to the already tenuous succession process 
within the organization. Without an accepted, legitimate Shura, succession of command 
could easily go from an already tense situation to a breaking point in the organizational 
unity. 
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2. Inability to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation 
In order for a terrorist organization to survive over decades, it must have the 
ability to either appeal to new followers or morph to do so.195  Without a contemporary 
message that resonates with the terrorist’s target audience, the message is simply lost, as 
is the support to the organization. Remaining relevant is a continuous problem for 
terrorist organizations in particular due to their insular nature, which tends to keep them 
apart from large portions of society.196  Therefore, it’s incumbent on the terrorists to 
know the current issues of the public to both seize on opportunities and remain part of the 
conversation. Specific to AQIM, they are required to maintain a close association with 
urban Algerian population centers and the separatist groups of the Sahel, like the 
Tuaregs.197 
a. Staying Relevant to Urban Algerians 
The majority of AQIM, nearly three quarters, reside within Algeria where 
a majority of the operations take place.198  Though AQIM is relatively scattered 
throughout Algeria, their most notable stronghold is in the Kabiyle Mountains to the 
Northeast of Algeria with access to the urban areas of Algeria along the coast.199 To stay 
relevant to potential supporters in these urban areas the GSPC changed its name and 
alignment to that of a successful brand, Al-Qaeda.200 The GSPC also pledged its support 
to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) during the height of Abu Musab Zarqawi’s successes.201  AQ-
I has faded from the limelight and seems to be on the path of failure. The same can be 
said of Al-Qaeda central following the death of Osama Bin Laden.   There have been few 
successful attacks or any such operation that shows any true capability that AQ had 
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exhibited in the early 2000s. So by mere affiliation AQIM’s star will dwindle as well, as 
the AQ moniker carries significantly less weight than in the past. In order to remain 
contemporary in the minds of AQIM’s target population in the urban centers they need to 
find themes that resonate. This organization has done this twice thus far, by changing 
from the GIA to the GSPC and to AQIM. Without another change, AQIM may follow the 
same path of its fellow AQ affiliates. 
b. Taking on the Tuareg Cause 
In the South, AQIM has a whole other challenge with influence. The 
Tuaregs of the Sahara are not as impressed by the AQ title, but by the counter-state goals 
of AQIM.202  Simply, the Tuareg’s wish to rebel from the states of the Sahel and form 
their own autonomous society.203  AQIM wants to see an end to the secular governments 
of the Sahel and install Sharia. Initially these goals are complimentary, but after 
autonomy has been achieved, how can AQIM remain relevant to the Tuaregs?  The 
Tuaregs, who have rebelled in Niger and Mali in recent years are quite capable of 
achieving their goals, but where does that leave AQIM?204 AQIM and the Tuaregs are 
likely to fight side-by-side in the initial throws against the state, but the Tuaregs are 
unlikely to maintain their support to AQIM during the phases following autonomy. 
3. Achievement of the Cause 
A stark end to a terrorist organization is the achievement of their cause.205  With 
the goals sufficiently met, the terrorist organization need not continue. Though this 
element seems rare; for terrorist organizations with narrow, clearly defined goals, strong 
external sponsors or causes where the terrorists faced a weak colonial power that was no 
                                                 
202 Another reason why the name change to AQIM was meant for internal Algerian consumption and 
less of an external maneuver to draw in the tribes of North Africa. 
203  Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel; The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali 
(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 10–11. 
204 Jeremy Keenan, “Mali’s Tuareg rebellion: What next?” Aljazeera, March 20, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123208133276463.html (accessed May 3, 2012). 
205 Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends,” 24–25. 
 49
longer willing or able to fight, terrorists often achieve their goals.206  AQIM’s cause is 
the establishment of an Islamic Algerian state under Sharia, with subordinate goals to 
depose the secular governments of the Sahel.207  
Meeting AQIM’s objective requires a dramatic change of events. AQIM must 
either sufficiently overcome the security forces of Algeria to force a toppling effect or the 
people of Algeria must rise up in support of AQIM’s cause. These scenarios are not 
mutually exclusive and could very well happen simultaneously, as success on one side 
would likely encourage success on the other. As was the case in the Iranian revolution of 
1979 where a student revolt quickly lead to an Islamist takeover.208  After the current 
regime has been effectively deposed, AQIM would then beat out fellow Islamist groups 
(like the former FIS) to establish its own regime.   
4. Negotiations Toward a Legitimate Political Process 
Often when a terrorist organization is either on the verge of success or failure, 
they enter negotiations and attempt to solve their grievance through the political 
process.209  Either one of two outcomes typically brings about this scenario. The terrorist 
organization has become a popular movement, has the ability to hold political office and 
therefore does so in order to dominate the political process. Conversely, the terrorist 
organization appears to be losing the initiative and chooses to move away from violence 
to politics to resolve their issues (this is typically a concession). Cronin further describes 
this element as being a major source of fracturing of terrorist organizations as the devout 
tend to stay the course of violence and the see the political figures as disingenuous.210  In 
AQIM’s situation the Shura council or members of the Council of Notables would need 
to actively seek joining the legitimate political process. 
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The first step toward such negotiation for AQIM would be to renounce violence 
and reconcile for their past injustices. A step that Algerian President Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika has offered to AQIM previously, but one which they have flatly refused.211  
However, attitudes and situations could change, and this change would be essential to 
evolve into a political AQIM. 
In order for AQIM to join the political process the Algerian government would 
have to be capable of allowing AQIM’s participation. Currently, Algeria’s political 
system is mostly closed off and only allows limited participation by competing political 
parties.212  Therefore, at the moment, this glimmer of hope for success for AQIM is not 
currently possible. 
Regimes, politics and attitudes do change over time. For AQIM to choose this 
route, the political process in Algeria must change to allow participation or this is not a 
viable option. Additionally, AQIM’s attitude toward participation in secular government 
systems must also change. AQIM’s current philosophy has remained unchanged since the 
takfiri decree in 1996 that made both active and passive participation with the secular 
regime akin to heresy.213 Just such political participation is directly against one of 
AQIM’s core beliefs. These beliefs would need to change in order for this sort of end to 
occur. 
5. Diminished Popular Support 
Terrorist organizations require popular support for their very survival. When a 
terrorist organization loses local support it loses anonymity, the ability to gain resources, 
recruits, targets and most importantly access to audiences of its choosing.214  In essence, 
the organization cannot operate nor sustain itself. Cronin highlights four ways this could 
occur:  the populace could fear the government repression measures caused by terrorist 
activity, the government can offer more opportunity, the terrorists cause can become 
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outdated and the population could detest the violent acts of terrorism.215  The GIA and 
GSPC has seen these four factors at some point in their lifetimes. Likewise AQIM has 
dealt with all of these issues and must continue to meet the challenge each case represents 
in order to survive. 
a. Public Fear of Government Repression 
Fear is a powerful tool and could be used by the state just as much as by 
the terrorist organizations. Aggressive counterterrorism measures implemented in direct 
response to terrorist attacks has a chilling effect upon the majority of the population. As 
was the case in the successful U.S. counterinsurgency campaign during the Philippine 
insurrection of the early 1900s.216 Simply, the average citizen does not want to get 
involved nor do they wish to be implicated with the terrorists. The net result is at a 
minimum apathy by the population to the terrorist’s cause or at the most collusion with 
the state to prevent the consequences of heavy-handed state repressive measures. 
Fear of state repression (both military and police) comes in another form, 
fear of change and continued war. Populations generally speaking, want normalcy and 
strict security measures that impede the daily life of citizens is an obstacle to that 
normalcy. Though state repressive measures can backfire on the state, citizens also blame 
the terrorists for the added traffic, security screening and the general feeling of being in a 
police state. In the long-term, citizens grow wary of the continued violence and simply 
want the conflict to end. This was much the case of the GSPC in the 2000s, which lead to 
their restructuring.217  For AQIM this is a very real threat to its existence, as little has 
changed since the days of the GSPC, except that AQIM is further disenfranchised from 
the public. 
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b. Government Opportunity as a Drain to Terrorist Recruitment 
Efforts 
Government reconciliation and economic growth are AQIM’s greatest 
threat in the long-term. Previous reconciliation efforts almost completely snuffed out the 
GSPC.218  In recent years Algeria has exhibited a growing economy with a surplus due to 
oil revenue.219  The result of a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is felt on the street, 
easing unemployment and general dissatisfaction with the government. AQIM’s 
recruiting pool and support base would suffer under these conditions. 
c. Outdated Ideology 
As mentioned previously in the section, “Staying Relevant to Urban 
Algerians,” the Al-Qaeda ideology is becoming increasingly less in vogue. The so-called 
“Arab Spring,” represents a contemporary ideology and methodology that has brought 
real tangible change to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The Al-Qaeda ideology has no 
comparative successes. The implication is that peaceful demonstrations, not jihad, can 
bring about the required change. Therefore, AQIM is simply not needed. Even given the 
Islamist views of AQIM, the Islamists of all three nations have made significant gains 
and appear to have achieved their goals without jihad. The lesson learned is that AQIM 
simply cannot succeed as well, so why support them. 
d. Revulsion to the Violence of Terrorism 
The public’s revulsion to violence was the primary reason for the GIA’s 
failing in the late 90s. The GIA perpetrated widespread massacres in suit with its takfiri 
edict.220 A more modern example is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s flagrant attempts to ignite 
a civil war in Iraq. What resulted was the “Awakening” where Sunnis saw that Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq had brought upon massive violence to Iraq and the previously dependable Sunni 
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support to Al-Qaeda diminished rapidly.221  Similarly, AQIM may find itself in the same 
situation with the bombing of the Algiers UN headquarters in 2007 an attack which 
caused extensive collateral damage and was unlikely to garner much favor from the 
public.222  
6. Repression of the Terrorist Group 
Government repression is an often used tool of the state when confronted with an 
internal terrorist organization. The government simply intensifies law enforcement efforts 
and employs overwhelming military power to diminish safe havens and stymie the 
growth of terrorist organizations.223  Terrorists are forced to enact strict security 
measures or consolidate on foreboding territory far from their intended targets just to 
ensure survival. Over time, this separation from the target areas reduces the terrorists’ 
ability to achieve success. Eventually, government repressive measures disperse the 
organization so severely that it cannot properly organize or the terrorist organization 
simply falls out of popularity due to its demonstrated ineffectiveness. Algerian security 
forces have employed state repressive measures to the extreme against AQIM. 
a. AQIM Pushed Outside of its Primary Target Area 
Algeria for the most part has been extremely effective at repressing AQIM 
within its borders. AQIM has been forced out of the major urban areas of Algeria, into 
the  Kabiyle Mountains and the Sahara desert where they can mingle in with the resident 
tribes that are fundamentally anti-government.224  Algeria’s armed forces are large and 
capable, with a standing military of 147,000.225  Since the coup of 1992 Algeria’s 
security forces have become exceptionally adept at quelling disorder and rooting out 
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extremists.226  AQIM is now at great distances from its primary target, the urban areas of 
Algeria, and equally so of its secondary targets, the urban areas of the Sahelian states.  
b. Future if AQIM Cannot Overcome the Repression 
AQIM can be worn down in its current areas and simply fail to regain the 
initiative. The consequences of AQIM’s separation from its target area and population are 
two-fold. AQIM has less access to its intended targets,  and AQIM simply will become 
more out of touch with the public that it is attempting to influence. Over time AQIM will 
lose relevance, recruits and eventually fade into obscurity. 
7. Transition to Another Modus Operandi 
Terrorist organizations, like most organizations, don’t simply go away, they 
typically turn into something else. This transition can either be deliberate or incidental. 
Cronin has divided this element into two categories for the sake of simplicity:  transition 
to conventional warfare or criminality.227  When a terrorist organization believes it has 
amassed the requisite strength against the state they may rise up as an insurgency, or in 
some cases as a conventional fighting force ready to lead a revolution or civil war. Other 
times a terrorist organization, so dependent on criminality for the purposes of self-
sustainment may over time dedicate most of its efforts to crime versus the original 
objective. A criminal course is likely when the original objective seems less achievable or 
no longer relevant, but the organization is still sufficiently organized. Basically, the 
terrorist hierarchy makes the relatively easy transition to a mafia hierarchy. AQIM would 
either need to break out into full civil war, as the GIA had in the 1990s, or given AQIM’s 
thorough attachment to the illicit trade of the Sahara, simply give higher priority to 
personal wealth, power and prestige. 
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a. AQIM Transition to Insurgency 
AQIM could amass the numbers to launch attacks in Algeria or the Sahel. 
To be effective in Algeria, AQIM would require some sort of catalyst to put themselves 
in a position to make the transition to a full insurgency. Namely, the Algerian security 
network would need to collapse, as in a regime collapse or a massive social movement. 
Just this sort of window of opportunity would allow AQIM to stir up the recruits to make 
an attempt to directly confront Algerian security forces through guerilla warfare. This is 
very much what had occurred with the GIA in 1990s.228   
AQIM may have a far easier time at overpowering a Sahelian nation. By 
co-opting the Tuaregs as mentioned previously, AQIM could very well topple a Sahelian 
state, albeit with a great deal of help from the Saharan tribesmen. This vary scenario 
seems to be playing out at the time of the writing this thesis, in Mali.229 The question that 
remains unanswered is what happens next?  Do the AQIM and Tuareg ideologies merge, 
will there be fighting between the former allies or will this insurgency be short lived? 
b. AQIM Transition to a Criminal Network 
There is a great deal of literature pointing to the potential for AQIM to go 
down the criminal path. Explicitly, with a weakening likelihood of achieving success in 
Algeria, does AQIM simply become another set of thugs and smugglers in the Sahara. 
This process would not be intentional, but an insidious shift to expanding operations to 
support drug operations for an example.230 Likewise, the resource intensive business of 
kidnapping for ransom can tie down an entire katiba, which, can find itself doing solely 
these operations.231  Over time AQIM cells become more concerned with financing and 
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growing turf than their original aspirations in the jihad. The slow relegation to primarily 
criminal activity was the case for the FARC.232  
C. AQIM’S END, AND THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED 
AQIM is unlikely to end outright, because an organization’s default position is 
survival in some form. In order to bring about an end there must be a catalyst to 
precipitate the end. Without a specific catalyst, like increased repressive measures, new 
government efforts to reconcile the conflict, or sudden loss of popular support due to a 
major errors in the terrorist strategy or attacks, an organization will tend to continue to 
exist. Though we know AQIM cannot and will not continue forever, something must 
happen to bring AQIM to its end. This section will discuss which AQIM ends are likely 
to occur and what it will take to make those ends possible. 
1. Probable Ends: Obsolescence, Repression, Succession and Crime 
AQIM may suffer its demise in one of four likely possibilities. These possibilities 
are separated for the purposes of analysis, but in reality they would occur in concert or in 
some combination. First, AQIM may lose popular support as the government of Algeria 
may enact significant change and provide a positive alternative to jihad. Second, AQIM 
may lose its safe haven in the Sahara either due to tribal reconciliation by the government 
or effective government repression measures. Third, in-fighting and internal fracturing 
may occur due to the independent structure of the leadership and the poor succession of 
command process within AQIM. Finally, an over-reliance on criminality for 
organizational sustainment may lead to the cells drifting further from jihad and more to 
criminal efforts.  
a. Obsolescence in the Wake of Political Change 
First, the origins for AQIM stem from the unjust reaction of the 
government to the Islamist electoral victories of the 1990s. The rallying cry for AQIM is 
the illegitimate nature of the Algerian government and the need to right the injustice of 
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the military coup of 1992. If the Algerian government were to reform, reconcile and offer 
legitimate elections, AQIM’s cause would no longer be as necessary. The result of better 
governance could serve to sap the strength of the jihad in both their ability to recruit and 
the important tacit support needed to operate. Within these constraints AQIM would find 
it far more difficult for its agents to maintain anonymity and supply themselves. AQIM 
would slowly fade out as an effective organization. 
b. Repression: Nowhere to Run but into the Desert Wasteland 
AQIM’s expansion to regional and international operations has provided 
renewed vitality for the organization, but has also highlighted AQIM’s necessity for safe 
haven. Specifically, the expanded Southern and Western zones of AQIM enjoy more 
freedom of operation outside the pressure of Algerian security forces than the Eastern and 
Central zones.233  Algerian security efforts have focused on the denial of the urban areas 
of Algeria to AQIM, and isolation into the depopulated Sahara. 
By expanding into regional affairs, AQIM has exposed itself to more 
opportunities, but simultaneously increased risk to multi-national security forces. 
Additionally, the fundamental goal of achieving an Islamic state in Algeria through jihad 
is now further from AQIM’s grasp. By expanding, AQIM has invited international 
pressure to squeeze AQIM out of its last stronghold, the Sahara. AQIM’s final bastion in 
the Sahara may disappear with reconciliation efforts underway in Mali, with the Tuareg 
tribes of the Northern Sahara, and increased regional security cooperation.234  The 
combined pressure of Algerian and international security pressure may cause the balloon 
to burst. 
c. Failures of Succession:  By Leader Targeting or Generational 
Gap 
Additionally, in-fighting due to the decentralization of the organization 
and a weak process for command succession may lead to AQIM’s fragmentation. AQIM 
has many internal disputes concerning the direction of the organization and leadership 
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decisions.235   Also, leadership targeting will likely cause fracturing instead of destroying 
AQIM.236  Individual cells are more likely to break from the main organization; lending 
possible credence to state reconciliation efforts or psychological operations to sow seeds 
of discontent between the AQIM cells and their headquarters.237  Disputes such as these 
could fragment the organization in the same way as the GSPC had fragmented away from 
the GIA in 1998. 
Two probable catalysts to infighting within AQIM could be leadership 
targeting and failure to transition to the next generation. AQIM is a deeply paranoid 
organization that has a penchant for ruthlessness.238  Leaders vying for power following a 
successful decapitation strike is not uncommon to Algerian terrorist organizations. 
Specifically, Droukdel’s demise would have a definite effect on the organization as a 
whole, given his tenure as the leader. His long term as leader has also imbued a specific 
form of Salafist ideology that may not represent contemporary audiences. The 
implication is that the organization could split along the lines of new and old generation, 
as was the case with the Baader-Meinhof group which became the Red Army Faction.239 
d. Crime Pays, a Failing Jihad Does Not 
The last case of probable failure is that the cells may drift more toward 
criminal activity than jihad operations as a result of the high dependence on illicit 
finances.   Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group is an example of this in action. Belmokhtar, who 
had lost favor with the leadership of AQIM, specifically Droukdel, has operated semi-
independently for years in the deserts of the Sahara.240  The concept of independent cells 
that are self-sufficient has required a mechanism to provide recruits, finances and 
mobility. 
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The criminal nature of the cells provides the required mechanism for self-
sustainment. Many of the cells are composed of former criminals or bandits with a long 
criminal history outside of jihad.241  Further using their experiences in criminality, 
AQIM has taken advantage of the smuggling networks for the purposes of moving 
people, equipment self-financing and the aforementioned kidnapping for ransom 
operations.242  Smuggling, ransoms and AQIM’s involvement in the drug trade have 
buoyed AQIM’s financial stability. These criminal activities offer a unique characteristic 
to AQIM’s self-sustainment. However, over-indulgence can lead to AQIM venturing 
closer to a mafia like organization, rather than its jihadist roots. AQIM’s extensive use of 
criminal networks may become means to their own end, such as the case with the like 
terrorist organizations of the FARC and Abu-Sayyaf.243 
2. Improbable Ends:  Success, Politics and Civil War 
a. AQIM Achieves its Goals 
Attainment of AQIM’s goal of an Islamic Algeria seems highly unlikely, 
and AQIM seems further from achieving that goal more than at any time in its long 
twenty year history. Sparking an insurgency or civil war in Algeria seems like quite a 
stretch and would require some fortuitous changes in the current situation to be probable. 
Complete success for AQIM appears to be quite a reach for two major reasons. First, 
none of the three caveats: narrow goals, strong external sponsor or ambivalent colonial 
power, that relate to an easy win for a terrorist organization are present. AQIM’s goals 
are very broad-reaching as opposed to the freeing of a political prisoner or the change of 
specific policy or law. Further, AQIM has no strong external partner like a state; nor is 
AQIM fighting a colonial power, but a resident regime. Second, success requires that 
AQIM not only beat the Algerian state, but to then defeat any peer competitors; 
something the GIA couldn’t do after being responsible for over 150,000 casualties in the 
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mid-90s.244  One last possibility on success, could be through joining the political 
process, and affecting regime change through that manner. However, the issue at question 
is how AQIM co-opts such a movement.   
b. AQIM Turns to Politics 
AQIM taking a turn toward politics seems to be quite an inviting idea, 
however there are some major roadblocks to such a possibility. Namely AQIM’s stated 
takfiri beliefs that it is not be involved in secular politics, has been the Algerian jihad’s 
battle cry since 1992.245  If AQIM were to move toward politics, this would likely only 
come with a split in the organization from the more devout followers of AQIM. In that 
scenario only portions may cede to politics but others will continue the mantle of jihad, 
so is it a true turn to politics?  AQIM has remained on the outside of Algerian society and 
fellow Islamist organizations like those that replaced the politically active FIS seem more 
likely to accede to power than the jihadist AQIM. 
c. AQIM Ignites a Civil War 
A renewed civil war as the GIA had fought in the 1990s, may have some 
concerned given the Arab Spring protests and the large number of weapons from Libya 
that are now available for a budding Algerian insurgency. However, the Algerian 
government has been extremely effective at cracking down on similar protests and has 
compiled a string of successes against AQIM in Algeria. It is unlikely that AQIM has the 
capability and local support to seriously confront Algerian security forces directly, or at a 
minimum, to the level that the GIA had achieved previously. Simply, public tolerance for 
such efforts has come and gone, and Algerian security forces are better equipped and 
trained for counterinsurgency while AQIM is weaker and more dispersed than previously. 
AQIM could also ignite a civil war in the Sahelian nations, as mentioned 
previously. With the aid of local tribes, and the limited resources of the Sahelian states, 
what is to stop them?  The problem lies within the tribes that AQIM would need to co-
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opt, specifically the Tuaregs. Tuareg is an Arabic word that means “the Abandoned of 
God.”246  This is not a name they have given themselves, but were given to them as an 
epithet by the conquering Arabs during the seventh century. The Arabs found these desert 
nomads to be ungovernable and unwilling to convert to their form of Islam. Eventually in 
the 1900s, the so-called Tuaregs did convert to a form of Sunni Islam that conveniently 
retained many of their originally religious beliefs.247  At the core of this issue is that the 
Tuaregs are against the governments of the Sahel, but they are not Salafists eager to 
install Sharia.248  A scenario where the Tuaregs, after winning a multigenerational fight 
for independence over the Sahelian governments, only to give up their victory to an 
Algerian Salafist organization is unlikely. A quote from the Tuareg leader of the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) seems to sum up the situation best:  
“What do Ansar al-Din and al-Qaeda mean?” [Mouhi Ag Boulkhei] asks. “What benefit 
can they bring to the people? We’ve already warned them to leave our land because we 
won’t be governed by people who don’t belong to us.”249 
For AQIM to prevail the relatively easier fight in the Sahel, they would 
have to defeat, convert or subjugate the vary people they depend upon for their survival 
in the Sahara. A very daunting task at best. There are many other possible scenarios that 
could lend itself to an AQIM victory, but all require substantial, if not improbable change 
to the current reality. In summary, these elements are the least likely to bring about the 
end to the AQIM we currently know. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
AQIM is a substantially resilient organization that has all the factors required for 
survival, but no organization can go on forever. Even with an optimistic outlook to 
AQIM’s future reveals that success, politics and renewed civil war are unlikely futures 
without significant changes. Changes that substantially alter the conditions on the ground. 
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However, fading into insignificance, collapsing under the yoke of repression, infighting 
and fixation on criminality are more probable outcomes for AQIM. The timeline for these 
ends are uncertain and an end to AQIM does not rule out some facet of the organization 
continuing under a new banner. In sum, an end may merely lead to a new birth. The 
importance to studying these ends is to evaluate what is probable and how these ends 
relate to U.S. strategy. By pairing probable ends with outcomes desirable to U.S. national 
objectives, the U.S. can develop strategies that facilitate a set of ends to AQIM. Ends that 
are most congruent to U.S. goals with the least likelihood of spawning the next 
generation of Algerian terrorists. The next chapter will discuss these vary goals and the 
counter-AQIM policy that is now being executed. 
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V. U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY TOWARD AQIM 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
U.S.. operations in the Maghreb and Sahel to counter AQIM, such as Operation 
Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), have a direct link to U.S. policy objectives 
and ultimately U.S. national interests as presented by the President. National interests set 
the stage for how the U.S. views possible solutions to problems, and here specifically, 
how the U.S. addresses a problem like AQIM. These interests directly affect our national 
policy objectives, which have set out to build partnership capacity with the nations of the 
Maghreb and Sahel to defeat AQIM. Further, the policy establishes the boundaries for the 
counter-AQIM strategy, which favor Sahelian partnerships due to operational limitations. 
The deviations in strategic and operational planning with the policy level create friction. 
This friction both desynchronizes the full national effort, but is also the catalyst to enact 
changes to policy that the strategy may be unable to achieve under the current 
boundaries. 
1. Definition of Key Terms 
In this chapter it is important to differentiate policy from strategy. Both of which 
are intrinsically intertwined, as they inform each other and can be viewed more as a cycle 
than a linear progression. Policy, is defined as, “a definite course or method of action 
selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine 
present and future decisions,” or ,”a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals 
and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body.”250  For the purposes of 
this thesis, U.S. policy toward AQIM will follow this definition, meaning that the policy 
is determined by those in the U.S. government from the information they currently know 
of AQIM. In similar fashion Strategy is formed in this way.   
Strategy is, “the science and art of employing the political, economic, 
psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum 
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support to adopted policies in peace or war.”251  In this way strategy is what is 
determined after the policy has been created thus a linear relationship. However, this is 
not how the system actually works. The policy is created which provides the boundaries 
for possible strategies. These strategies then return to the policy makers in a feedback 
loop, which informs the policy makers what it will actually take to employ the policy. An 
example of this in action is General Eric Shinseki’s now famous congressional testimony 
about the size of forces required to occupy Iraq.252  The strategist (Shinseki) was 
informing the policy makers (the Senate Armed Services Committee) what the limitations 
were of a policy of regime change in Iraq with a limited footprint. The concept is that 
through this feedback loop, policy is amended and new strategies are produced, although 
in this case the desired outcome is not always achieved. This cycle is continuous and 
changes as information about the situation and the desired end-state evolve over time.  
In the United States politicians and diplomats author policy; specifically, the 
President and Executive Branch, Congress, Ambassadors and the diplomats in the various 
Bureaus within the State Department; based on U.S. national interests. U.S. strategy is 
authored by the government agencies like the National Security Council,  Department of 
Defense and to some extent the sub departments of the State Department. This strategy 
informs policy in a feedback loop. Thus our starting point for policy and strategy are U.S. 
national goals. 
2. The Path From Policy to Strategy 
The U.S. national goals or interests can be found in various locations: the 
Preamble of the U.S. Constitution, the President’s State of the Union addresses as it 
relates to matters of national security, and the President’s National Security Strategy 
(NSS). The NSS is a periodically updated document of national security objectives that 
feeds the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, National Defense Strategy, and 
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National Military Strategies. These documents restate policy and introduce the strategy 
used to counter AQIM. The Strategy serves the operational plans created by the 
operational level commands; for this thesis, USAFRICOM (United States Africa 
Command) and SOCAFRICA (Special Operations Command Africa). The NSS is the 
starting point used for this thesis, because of the clear cogent way these elements align.   
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARD AQIM 
1. U.S. National Security Strategy 
The NSS states that the U.S. national interests are, security, prosperity, universal 
values, and international order.”253  These four interests are not independent, but 
interrelated and codependent. The Obama administration defines security of Americans 
as the most important responsibility along with the additional requirement to “promote 
international security.”254 Prosperity is founded on the notion of a, “prosperous American 
economy.”255 Universal values, as stated by the NSS, is based on the belief that, “certain 
values are universal and [the U.S.] will work to promote them worldwide.”256   Finally, 
the U.S. seeks to encourage, “a just and sustainable international order that can foster 
collective action to confront common challenges.”257  The NSS’s four national interests 
define U.S. policy to meet those interests and for the purposes of this thesis define the 
highest echelon of U.S. policy toward AQIM. 
The NSS is the source for the initial framework of the counter-AQIM policy as a 
function of the national interests. With regards to security, AQIM is termed as an Al-
Qaeda “affiliate,” therefore subject to the, “disrupt, dismantle and defeat,” policy set forth 
in the NSS.258  Further, this policy specifies that it will protect, “the [U.S.] homeland... 
denies al-Qa’ida safe-haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities 
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around the world.”259  Of note is the allusion to U.S. pre-emptive action which states that, 
“Al-Qaeda must not be permitted to gain or retain any capacity to plan and launch 
international terrorist attacks, especially against the U.S. homeland.”260  These two 
passages establish the policy for both aggressive action to find and attack the AQIM, and 
to do so preemptively before they have the ability to attack the U.S. or its interests. 
Only one passage specifically mentions AQIM within the NSS:  “Wherever al-
Qa’ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven as they have in ... the 
Maghreb, and the Sahel we will meet them with growing pressure... [and] strengthen our 
own network of partners to disable al-Qaida’s... networks.”261  Within the same 
paragraph of the NSS is an emphasis on international law-enforcement, intelligence and 
CT cooperation as the method to deny and dismantle AQ safe havens.262  The 
significance is that though the earlier passages invoke preemptive rights of the U.S. to 
attack emerging threats, the following passages prioritize that effort through cooperation 
and non-unilateral action. Further, subsequent passages discuss not overreacting to the 
threat, which can cause the U.S. more international harm, and the judicious use of 
force.263  Thus, from the national interest of “security” within the NSS, the U.S. policy is 
to prevent AQIM  from action, deny them safe haven and ultimately utilize non-unilateral 
pressures to accomplish these goals; yet use unilateral force with restraint only if 
necessary. 
The next national interest that is germane to the discussion of AQIM is the 
“international order,” which dovetails with the emphasis on non-unilateral action.   The 
U.S. is specifically interested in encouraging effective partnerships that help prevent 
conflict within the African continent, calling U.S. cooperation “consultative.”264  The 
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emphasis is on “building partnership capacity,” or the ability of the African nations to 
take on more of a leading role; requiring less U.S. intervention.265   The policies 
associated with the national interest of an international order place the precedence of U.S. 
involvement with regards to AQIM as primarily advising North African governments and 
their a corresponding security sector organizations to disrupt, dismantle and defeat AQIM 
on behalf of combined U.S. and the African nations’ interests. When combined with the 
policy from the security interest, U.S. policy toward AQIM equates roughly to a policy of 
proactively disrupting, dismantling and defeating AQIM by, with or through the use of 
African governments and security forces. Further U.S. unilateral force should be used 
discreetly and only when necessary. This policy feeds to the next document which 
addresses specifically the counterterrorism policy. 
2. U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategy 
The National Counterterrorism Strategy is a document that reiterates the U.S. 
national interests and focuses more closely on terrorism. This document is also authored 
by the National Security Staff and endorsed by the President. Within 2011 CT strategy 
the national interests, as they relate to counterterrorism, are further refined to four 
principles: adhering to U.S. core values, building security partnerships, applying CT tools 
and capabilities appropriately, and cultural resilience.266  The overall message is similar 
to the NSS, meaning that the U.S. CT strategy sets the policy for seeking to uphold U.S. 
values by leveraging international partnerships and engaging the full breadth of the 
elements of national power to establish an environment that is resistant to Al-Qaeda’s 
efforts.267  Further, where necessary, the U.S. will use ethical and judicious application of 
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force to meet those ends. The most pronounced difference in the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism (NSCT) comes in the more detailed description of the U.S. plan in 
dealing with AQIM. 
The detail within this strategy focuses on two primary areas: an initial assessment 
or description and the proposed way ahead. Herein the document, AQIM is viewed as an 
Algerian rooted insurgency which has, “shifted its center of gravity southward,” for the 
purposes of evading the strong Algerian for the weaker Sahelian security forces.268  
Additionally, this move places AQIM in an area of instability where access to weapons 
and illicit goods are readily available.269  AQIM has also used kidnappings as a source of 
revenue to maintain itself, making the  Sahel unsafe for westerners.270  Combined, the 
NSCT describes AQIM as an organization that threatens U.S. interests by its shift 
southward where it can affect the weaker Sahelian nations and has potential to strike U.S. 
interests in the region.271 
The response to the AQIM incursion is in line with the NSCT, in that of building 
resilience to AQIM efforts. This will be accomplished through building regional capacity 
to deal with AQIM, and specifically notes that traditional CT tools do not represent the 
total resolution to the threat.272  Regional partnership and capacity building support 
multiple lines of operation against AQIM and ultimately make the Sahel more immune to 
further AQIM infiltration.273  However, the U.S. does retain the right and where 
necessary, to take steps in the near-term to directly address the problem of AQIM.274   
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The total strategy is to “contain disrupt, degrade and dismantle AQIM.”275  Most of these 
goals refer to the “resilience” principle referenced earlier in the NSCT, but of interest are 
what the NSCT terms as “enabling elements,” which may refer to the Tuaregs within the 
Sahel, Boko-Haram of Nigeria and the various criminal or terrorist organizations of the 
Maghreb/Sahel which directly or indirectly allow AQIM to survive and thrive within the 
region.276 
Two other references within the NSCT have marked importance to the total 
strategy toward AQIM: the use of U.S. force and the importance of Algeria. Though the 
strategy states the U.S. right and reasons for using force, there is also specific discussion 
of weighing the “costs and benefits” of such action as they relate to “regional dynamics 
and perceptions.”277  The significance is that this cautionary language is used in the 
NSCT when discussing CT in Europe, and not used for South Asia, East Africa, the 
Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Southeast Asia and Central Asia strategies; meaning that the 
strategy for these latter regions is set apart from the strategy toward AQIM.278  Plainly, 
from the viewpoint of the NSCT authors, U.S. CT force used in the Maghreb and Sahel is 
comparably sensitive to similar actions taken in Europe, versus force used in the other CT 
focus areas. This point will have further significance in this chapter when Department of 
State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies are discussed. 
The reference to Algeria is another significant point that has an impact on the 
eventual strategy adopted by the agencies of the U.S. Government. The NSCT states that 
cooperation, “between the Algerian and Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Mali, and 
Niger as an essential element,” in defeating AQIM.279  This basically says that not only is 
U.S. bilateral partnership capacity building of importance, but that a multi-national 
interdependent partnership is vital. Moreover, this multi-national effort with Algeria is 
the lynchpin to the strategy to counter AQIM.    As with the previous reference of 
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cautionary language, this multi-national partnership will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the DOS and DoD strategies. Though the NSCT is the source document for U.S. CT 
policy, the U.S. intelligence bureaus also inform policy.  
3. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which reports to both the 
President and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), provides an assessment of the 
threat posed by AQIM to the policy makers in the U.S. government.280  Ms. Maren 
Brooks of the NCTC assesses, “that [AQIM] poses no direct threat to the U.S. homeland, 
but to its interests.”281  Further, the most pressing threat posed by AQIM is the increase 
in successful KFR operations, of which AQIM has netted millions of dollars from 
European nations.282  Though given the uptick in attention to AQIM in the recent years, 
NCTC views AQIM as a schizophrenic organization that may fracture and collapse on its 
own or fail due to loss in funding.283 
Given this assessment, the NCTC views that two approaches are necessary to 
properly counter AQIM: building partner capacity and attacking AQIM’s finances.284  
Building partner capacity for the NCTC is the same sort of capacity building mentioned 
in the NSCT, and vies to increase the regional partners of the Maghreb/Sahel capabilities 
to deal with AQIM on their own.285  Brooks views Algeria as the regional leader in this 
matter and “pivotal” to an overall counter-AQIM strategy, to the extent that Algeria 
views themselves as being capable of handling AQIM without major U.S. 
intervention.286  The Sahel countries are both less able and willing to counter AQIM as 
compared to Algeria. For this reason, Brooks believes the long-term solution is to build 
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regional capability and will, but in the near-term interdicting AQIM’s KFR operations is 
important.287  KFR represents not just the threat to U.S. interests, but the resources by 
which AQIM funds larger operations and is fundamental to its survival as an 
organization.288  Essentially, NCTC advocates for a policy that increases partner capacity 
in the region and neutralizes AQIM’s ability to finance through  KFR. The combination 
of the assessment provided by the NCTC and the policy written in the NSCT add another 
layer to the foundation of the U.S. policy, advising DOS, who produce the subsequent 
level of the counter-AQIM policy. 
4. U.S. State Department 
The diplomats of the Department of State provide the detailed policy on how the 
U.S. elements of national power will be used to counter AQIM. How DOS arrives at this 
policy is through the policy documents/assessments from other agencies and by relatively 
non-hierarchical collaboration between the professional bureaus of State. In terms of 
AQIM, the bureaus of Counterterrorism, Near Eastern Affairs and African Affairs have 
reasonably similar levels of authority, and serve to inform each other. This is in contrast 
to a DoD structure which is predominantly top-down or bottom-up, as compared to the 
lateral collaboration illustrated by DOS. Lateral collaboration provides the slight 
variations between the bureaus that will be discussed below, but also a lack of clear 
understanding of the total DOS policy as viewed by the other government agencies 
(particularly DoD). The various bureaus of State contribute their input toward an AQIM 
policy, creating an amalgam of professional experiences from their bureaus’ point of 
view. 
a. State Bureau for Counterterrorism 
The State Bureau for Counterterrorism (S-CT) provides the closest to a 
concise AQIM policy, as they cover all aspects of the organization, whereas the Bureaus 
of African and Near Eastern Affairs are more germane to their regional focus areas. This 
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is not to say that S-CT holds the entire policy or authority over the other bureaus, they do 
not. They contribute their input which is of relative equal weight with the other bureaus 
and embassies. Though for the purposes of this thesis, beginning with S-CT provides a 
point of continuity when viewing DOS. 
The official policy from S-CT is to “contain, marginalize and disrupt 
AQIM,” which comes from their analysis of the threat and U.S. interests in the region.289  
Foremost, according to S-CT, AQIM does not pose a threat to any, “vital U.S. interests 
[and the U.S. interests] are limited.”290 Further, “there is nothing to make [the U.S.] think 
that there has been a line crossed that requires [U.S.] involvement,” specifically 
addressing DoD pressure to increase the U.S. military role.291  S-CT assesses that AQIM 
will not reach its “jihadist goals” (of winning the insurgency in Algeria and establishing 
an Islamist government) and the stronger force is contained to the Kabiyle Mountains of 
Algeria and the weaker elements are in the Sahel.292  This last comment is significant, 
because the majority of western media attention and intelligence work focuses on the 
Sahel. 
The Sahel has gained a great deal of attention in the last decade due to the 
increase in westerners taken for ransom and the murder of a U.S. citizen in Mauritania. S-
CT explains both of these situations very simply: KFR has increased, because the 
Europeans pay the ransom and the American who was killed, Christopher Leggett, was a 
Christian missionary who had been warned numerous times over concerns for his safety 
to stop his proselytizing and attempted conversion of Muslim Mauritanians.293  
Therefore, the relatively mild U.S. response to these actions seems warranted. S-CT has 
gauged their Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI), 
and Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Program (TSC-TP) as successful in preventing the 
expansion of AQIM, and the organization of roughly 800 fighters will be further 
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contained, marginalized and is expected to eventually transform into mainly criminal 
activity.294  This assessment is what has determined the S-CT policy toward AQIM and 
the strategy forward. 
S-CT’s policy is in line with the NSS and NSCT policies by primarily 
focusing on building partnership capacity without the U.S. military in the lead. The S-CT 
programs evolved sequentially to form the program of record  called TSCTP, costing 
roughly $145 million annually.295  This program provides CT equipment and training 
primarily for the Sahel countries of Mali, Mauritania and Niger (though Senegal, Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso and Chad also participate).296  TSCTP focuses on building the CT 
capability for the countries to produce the resilience to further AQIM incursion in their 
nations. 297  This capability is to be improved in law enforcement, border security, CT 
forces and aviation assets.298  Though this program has been “successful,” it has not been 
a smooth road, particularly in the Sahel.299  Both Niger and Mauritania, which have a 
relative strong will to combat AQIM, have been marred by recent coups and State 
Department human rights re-evaluations; causing the programs to fall off track.300  Mali 
has been defined as having less will to fight AQIM, and has been more concerned with 
the Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali over the recent years.301 Noticeably, Algeria is not 
one of those countries that regularly participates in the program for one specific reason: 
they view AQIM as an African not American problem.302 
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Algeria has represented a significant problem to the S-CT strategy. 
Whereas Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (the Maghreb Countries) are assessed to be more 
capable of dealing with the AQIM threat and less needing of U.S. support; they are still a 
major part of the overall strategy.303  Here Algeria is “adamantly opposed to U.S. boots 
or lead” and have refused many attempts at partnership.304  Some progress has been made 
in limited training and equipment, but Algeria has often failed to reciprocate and has 
refused to sign end of use agreements for equipment.305  Additionally, the multi-national 
headquarters established in Tamanrasset, Algeria (Southern Algeria) that showed promise 
of providing synchronized Maghreb/Sahel CT efforts has provided few gains as Algeria 
seems to want to be the hub for the incoming information and plans, but has done little to 
take the lead or share intelligence or information with the Sahel nations.306 
Though State’s programs have met with many obstacles along the way, S-
CT’s view is that overall the programs are a long-term success.307  This assessment is 
based on the steady progress made in the region and that AQIM has failed to expand 
beyond the ungoverned space of the northern Sahel.308  In part this is due to lack of 
responsiveness to the AQIM Salafist movement in a predominantly Sufi region of Africa; 
causing a general lack of interest to participate in AQIM’s cause.309  Thus, S-CT views 
the best policy as using a long-term strategy with limited U.S. military forces involved 
that will take “ten years or more.”310  This policy is basically shared by the other 
bureaus’ of State. 
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b State Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs 
The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) covers the North African 
States from Morocco in the West to Egypt in the East, and includes the Middle Eastern 
countries to Iran. NEA views AQIM as the “most important intelligence and CT issue for 
NEA in the region [of North Africa].”311  This view is in spite of the assessment that 
“AQIM does not pose a threat to [the U.S.].”312  NEA’s position is based on AQIM as 
having its ideological base in the Kabiyle region of Algeria and its Southern forces (in the 
Sahel) more focused on criminality.313  The reason that AQIM persists is due to their use 
of culturally enabled safe havens, with the Berber nationalist movement in the Kabiyle 
region and the Tuareg tribal areas of the Sahel.314 
The notion of safe haven is central to NEA’s assessment of AQIM. This 
safe haven is essential, because AQIM has been, “neutered by Algeria… and has changed 
its focus [to the Sahel] due to [this] circumstance.”315  The only way AQIM can achieve 
spectacular effects is through KFR or the occasional “limited raid.”316  Another 
contributing factor to this safe haven is the general unwillingness of Algerian CT forces 
to operate outside of their borders.317  This has set the stage for the policy to counter a 
dying Algerian insurgent organization, which persists over the border in the Sahel. 
NEA’s policy, as with S-CT, aligns well with the NSS and NSCT. Algeria 
is viewed as the, “number one partner in CT in Northern Africa,” with border security 
training and some limited intelligence sharing (the building partnership capacity principle 
found in the NSCT).318 Adhering to U.S. core values and developing a cultural resistance 
is also apparent in the NEA policy. NEA views Algerian government reform, with an 
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open society and encouraged entrepreneurship as the “only solution” to AQIM.319  In 
essence NEA assesses AQIM as a problem, with Algeria as the solution. 
c The U.S. Ambassador to Algeria 
U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, Henry Ensher, assesses AQIM as not an 
urgent threat to the U.S. and that Algeria is the center for solutions to AQIM as well. 
Ambassador Ensher describes AQIM as not posing, “a physical threat to the mainland of 
the United States [and] it’s not at all clear, and there is no particular evidence that they 
are interested in targeting the United States itself.”320  Further Ambassador Ensher stated 
that, “They are very much interested in their home turf which is Algeria and the 
Sahel...[making them] currently a threat to U.S. interests [in the region] rather than a 
physical threat to lives and property.”321  Fundamentally taking the stance that AQIM can 
threaten our allies or destabilize the region, but there is no pressing need to aggressively 
pursue AQIM. 
Ambassador Ensher further expounded on his thoughts on the “mixed” 
motivations of AQIM from deep religious conviction to low-level criminal 
motivations.322  AQIM’s propaganda  has been described as having a, “jihadi approach to 
the world and that they are duty-bound to impose their version of Sharia law on Algeria 
and other states.”323  This belief is straddled by the AQIM belief that they’re world view 
has been excluded in Algeria and that there is no other way to achieve their objectives but 
by violence.324  The feeling of political exclusion is further compounded by feelings of 
personal exclusion from society, which has driven a number of young Algerian’s to 
criminal activity and AQIM; as they feel there is no other way to improve their way of 
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life.325  However, fundamentally AQIM views itself as part of the broader AQ struggle, 
their primary objective is to overthrow the government of Algeria and install their version 
of Sharia.326 
The notion of Algeria as the centerpiece for AQIM’s strategy is the 
foundation of the Ambassador’s assessment. AQIM’s “victory” would be taking over 
Algeria while the Sahel is a “staging area” for this primary objective, versus declaring 
victory by installing an Islamic state in the Sahel.327  Ambassador Ensher does agree that, 
given the events of the recent “Arab Spring” with instability in the region, particularly 
Libya, AQIM’s goals could change, but there is no evidence that that has yet occurred.328  
This correlates to the Ambassador’s policy forward, with Algeria as the focus for a 
counter-AQIM strategy. 
The policy has Algeria in the lead with the U.S. supporting the effort by 
direct support and by building partner capacity in the region. Here the Ambassador states 
that the U.S. should “fall in on the Algerian approach,” which he describes as working 
closely with and supporting the efforts of the regional states, using the full spectrum of 
efforts: development programs, training, information sharing and equipping, and 
following one strategic vision versus developing our own strategy.329  Further, AQIM 
would end if the states of the region were able to engage in full spectrum counter 
insurgency and CT: projecting governance into the area, economic development that 
would provide a clear alternative, and multi-national cooperation to use law enforcement 
and military action to constrain AQIM’s areas of operation and their ability to recruit.330  
As mentioned in S-CT’s policy, the policy is long-term. The Ambassador sees the 
ultimate solution, much as NEA has, as government reform to encourage economic 
prosperity and to be inclusive on every level of society to encourage Algerian’s to take 
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part positively in society by showing that they have alternatives to terrorism.331  These 
reforms will not occur overnight, nor will they immediately resonate with the 
disenfranchised, but overtime can whittle away at the drive for action by AQIM. 
d State Bureau for African Affairs 
The State Bureau of African Affairs (S-AF) fundamentally concurs that 
Algeria could solve the AQIM threat themselves.332  S-AF assesses AQIM as, “a 
potential problem, versus a problem,” that could threaten U.S. citizens and facilities in 
the Maghreb and Sahel, but not the mainland U.S.333  The potential problem stems from 
the S-AF notion that AQIM has essentially lost the fight to establish an Islamic state in 
Algeria and has been forced to broaden itself to a more regional agenda.334  With the 
shift, AQIM has had to change their approach. S-AF views AQIM’s shift as out of 
necessity, which has driven them toward criminality, specifically KFR, to buy off local 
loyalty in an area mostly unsupportive of Salafist ideology.335  AQIM needs the funds 
generated from criminality to negotiate with the illicit groups inherent in the Tuareg lands 
of the Sahel. This new emphasis on criminality leads S-AF to view that AQIM will not 
likely end, but remain as a relatively marginal threat without gaining ground on their 
objectives.336 
The persistent marginal threat presented by AQIM has led S-AF to 
conclude that if AQIM is isolated to the rugged areas of Northern Mali and fails to 
project out, that there is no reason to escalate a counter-AQIM strategy.337   In order to 
prevent AQIM from projecting out of its isolated areas S-AF proposes the policy of 
building a resistant Sahel, in-line with the “cultural resistance” mentioned in the 
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NSCT.338  The purpose is not to defeat the criminality, but to isolate AQIM from western 
interests.339  As mentioned by the other bureaus, a regional partnership is key for this 
strategy to work effectively, which facilitates the limited U.S. role sought by S-AF.340  
Simply put S-AF sees AQIM as a potential threat that will endure, but the U.S. can help 
to inoculate the region to prevent the threat from expanding outward. With the addition of 
S-CT and S-NEA’s greater emphasis on finding solutions with Algeria, holistically this is 
State’s policy with regards to AQIM.  
C. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD AQIM 
1. Policy Reiterated in Strategy 
a. The National Defense Strategy 
The policy is reiterated in a few strategy documents like the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), which serve as the first 
line of U.S. strategy to defeat AQIM. The 2008 NDS focuses on providing for the 
common defense and the responsibility of the defense strategy to not only defend the 
homeland, but U.S. global interests.341  The NDS focuses on the international order, 
building partner capacity, as well as the defense of the homeland as the policy issues the 
military must confront.342  The primary purpose of these documents is to introduce the 
top level of our national counter-AQIM strategy or how these policy objectives will be 
accomplished by DoD. 
One key area of emphasis in the NDS is on building partner capacity and 
serving the cultural resilience as mentioned in the NSCT. In 2007, Defense Secretary 
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Robert Gates defines the cause against AQ and its affiliates as “the Long War,” which 
requires, “the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all 
elements of national and international power.”343  Further, Gates views the loose network 
nature of the AQ affiliates as requiring individual strategies that specifically address the 
regional grievances that fuel the local drive to align with AQ.344  Bearing this in mind, 
Gates points out that local nations are better suited to deal with their local AQ problems 
and U.S. capture/kill operations are, “likely subordinate to measures to promote local 
participation in government [and programs to address the local grievance].”345  As this 
relates to AQIM, the NDS essentially implies that a strategy must be developed to deal 
with the local grievance (Algerian government reforms) and U.S. use of force, though 
applicable, is subordinate to addressing the Algerian grievance as the root cause for 
AQIM’s allegiance to AQ.  
b The National Military Strategy 
The NMS is slightly more specific when it addresses the strategy toward 
AQIM as building partner capacity and, where necessary, assisting the nations of the 
Trans-Sahel.346 Here the intent is to, “identify and encourage states and organizations 
that have a demonstrated leadership role to... contribute to Africa’s security.”347  The 
significance is that Admiral Michael Mullen is stating that the principle component of his 
strategy in the Trans-Sahel is to find the right partners, to ensure the security of the U.S.’s 
African interests. The nations that seem to best fit this model, based on capability and 
will, are Algeria and Morocco, both in the Maghreb; whilst in the Trans-Sahel Niger is 
most capable and willing, Mali and Mauritania are in the proximity, but both lack the will 
and resources. Neither the NDS nor the NMS delve very deeply into AQIM strategy, but 
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they set the stage for the geographically oriented offices in DoD to plan within the left 
and right limits of these strategy documents. 
2. Where Policy and Strategy Meet 
a. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Policy 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Policy, OUSD(P), supports 
DoD with assessments and policy advice based on U.S. national security objectives.348  
Simply, OUSD(P) provides assessments for future use of DoD and the corresponding 
policy recommendations internal to DoD. Though called “policy,” for the purposes of this 
thesis, the work of OUSD(P) is best defined as strategy advice, as it is only policy to 
those inside DoD and would be externally viewed as a component of DoD strategy. 
Given this construct, OUSD(P) provides one of the major components of DoD strategy 
next to the assessments produced by the regional combatant commands (i.e. United States 
Africa Command, United States European Command, etc...). 
Mike Banaszewski from OUSD(P) assess AQIM as a dying threat to 
Algeria, but an increasing threat to the Sahel. Banaszewski’s point of view is that Algeria 
has mostly removed AQIM from within their borders.349   Moreover, AQIM has remained 
viable because, “Mali and Niger cannot control the area [allowing] AQIM to prosper.”350  
The threat AQIM poses is described as, “limited to the U.S.,” yet, “significant to the 
regional forces;” citing that KFR is the only real current threat to U.S./Western 
interests.351  The perceived shift of AQIM to the Sahel is representative of a change in 
goals to secure territory within the Sahel from their previous Algerian goals. 
Banaszewski surmises that AQIM will attempt to remain, “in the mind of Algeria,” while 
using the AQ moniker as a means to help secure their Sahelian objectives. Within the 
Sahel Banaszewski calls the relationship between AQIM and the local Tuareg tribes as, 
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“not ideological or political, but financial,” requiring both KFR and the AQ name for a 
means of producing revenue.352  Banaszewski cites the possibility of developing 
relationships with al-Shabab, Boko-Haram, and potential involvement in shoulder fired 
surface to air missile proliferation as potential threats to the U.S.353 
The real and potential Sahelian threat posed by AQIM has lead to 
OUSD(P)’s  strategic recommendation for increasing partnership capacity in the region. 
Banaszewski believes the focus should be on the Civil-Military Operations Coordination 
Center (CMOCC) countries: Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Mali; to disrupt AQIM and 
potentially shut down the KFR network.354  The primary role for the U.S. is to advise and 
assist these countries to fill their own capability gaps, by means of the TSC-TP and the 
Joint Special Operations Task Force - Trans Sahara (JSOTF-TS).355  Examples of this 
type of assistance is counter-IED training for Algeria, logistical training for Mali and 
helping to normalize tribal relationships in Niger.356  Collectively, this strategy is meant 
to counter AQIM’s expansion, neutralize the KFR threat and though not expected to 
destroy AQIM in its entirety, is likely to wear them down significantly. 
b The Pentagon and Joint Staff 
Those in the Pentagon share the opinions of OUSD(P) as the initial level 
of the strategy, but based on their own assessments, view the threat posed by AQIM as 
more complex and potentially dangerous. A Pentagon official stated that the official DoD 
policy toward AQIM was that it was the, “number three concern on the continent [of 
Africa] next to the ‘Arab Spring’ and al-Shabab.”357 Additionally, there is growing 
concern over possible collusion with Boko-Haram and the proliferation of the 
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aforementioned surface to air missiles.358 Further, the Joint Staff is skeptical whether 
there is a clear link between the AQIM in Algeria and that of the AQIM in Sahel; arguing 
that the Algerian AQIM has remained steadfast in its goal to overthrow the government 
of Algeria, while the Sahelian AQIM is more opportunist and focused on criminal 
entrepreneurship than the AQIM Islamist ideology.359  The Joint Staff does not see an 
end to AQIM without a significant change in enemy action requiring U.S. intervention.360  
In total, AQIM is viewed as a growing threat in the Sahel, and U.S. intervention can be 
the best spoiler of this expansion. 
Building partner capacity again is the first choice to deal with AQIM, 
however, these efforts have not been very fruitful.   The CMOCC, which held a great deal 
of hopes for regional cooperation, has failed to pay any dividends.361  Although Algeria 
is viewed as the lynchpin to any partnership concerning AQIM; Algeria has not 
participated as actively as expected, forcing U.S. forces to turn to other nations for more 
productive partnerships.362  Within Mali specifically, partnership has been down to the 
lowest unit level, but has failed to significantly impact the effectiveness of the higher 
government or military institutions.363 The concern is that the elements of national power 
are not being properly synchronized, and the U.S. military may be getting ahead of the 
diplomatic reform efforts, preventing the proper conditions to be met for  military 
partnership efforts to be successful.364  The net result of these partnership challenges is a 
view that partnership efforts alone may be inadequate to defeat AQIM. 
The lack of results in partnership has led some to view an increase in U.S. 
involvement as the correct answer. An attempt to shrink AQIM’s Sahelian safe haven 
through regional partnership is seen as a solution only as long as AQIM is not a direct 
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threat to the U.S. However, if AQIM exhibits clear indications as a threat to the U.S., 
combined and unilateral operations are preferred to strike at AQIM.365  U.S. intervention 
or escalation is seen as inevitable and justified, through proactive attacks on the 
organization before it manifests into a significant threat. The comprehensive strategy 
calls for more diplomatic efforts to provide better success in the Sahelian partnerships 
and to have the flexibility and forethought to have U.S. forces available to intervene 
directly or in combination with regional partners.  
3. U.S. Strategy from the Bottom-Up against AQIM 
The need for regional partnership is reiterated by the operational assessments of 
USAFRICOM and JSOTF-TS.366  A USAFRICOM North Africa analyst characterizes 
the threat of AQIM as credible toward U.S. “soft targets and citizens,” but has not shown 
a willingness nor capability to threaten the U.S. directly.367  JSOTF-TS J3 (officer in 
charge of operations) Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Schmitt agrees, but warns that, 
“there was no clear and present danger 15 years ago in Kabul either [and] maybe putting 
pressure on them is preventing [a spectacular AQIM attack] from happening;” conveying 
the potential threat posed by AQIM.368  The AFRICOM analyst views AQIM as “equally 
weighted” between Algeria and the Sahel, serving different immediate purposes, though 
together serve the long-term goal of overthrowing the government of Algeria.369 LTC 
Schmitt mostly agrees, but views the southern (Sahelian) portion of AQIM as almost a 
separate franchise, with its own objectives; separated from the staunch ideology of the 
Northern AQIM forces.370   In Algeria, the successes against AQIM have forced them out 
of the urbanized areas, proving that effective CT efforts, without U.S. intervention have 
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had a significant effect.371  However, both the AFRICOM analyst and LTC Schmitt view 
AQIM’s ability to conduct KFR operations in the Sahel as a major enemy “center of 
gravity.”372  This center of gravity could be disrupted through partnership building in the 
region, specifically by Mali, Niger and Mauritania.373 
Based on the assessment of AQIM’s threat in the Sahel, JSOTF-TS has proposed 
a strategy to work all angles to improve partnership in the region. The pinnacle of this 
regional partnership has been the annual “Flintlock Exercise” involving the TSC-TP 
nations and many European allies; forming a combined headquarters to fight simulated 
battles against AQIM or other likely regional threats.374  These efforts have been lauded, 
recently as participation has grown and the African nations have become more 
accustomed to working with each other.375  Routine exercises like Flintlock and Joint 
Combined Exercises and Training (JCET’s), running an annual budget of about $25 
million dollars, have proven to be the primary vehicle to encourage partnership in the 
region and bolster their capabilities.376  The Sahelian nations have been the primary 
beneficiaries of this training. 
Algeria has not been excluded purposefully, but has chosen to exclude itself. LTC 
Schmitt summarizes, “it’s hard to work with Algeria, they distrust us... [and] the 
Algerian’s don’t know how to work with us. We’re bottom-up and they’re top-down.”377  
Schmitt cited Algeria’s refusal to participate in the “Flintlock” exercises, the last minute 
refusal of the Algerian government to train Algerian Special Forces in the United States 
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(a JCET on their terms) and the lack of reciprocation whenever gains were made.378  
Though confronted with these challenges, the basis of JSOTF-TS’s strategy is to continue 
to build partnership capacity to keep the pressure on AQIM and prevent them from 
emerging as a more lethal threat to the U.S. and its regional partners. 
D. WHERE INTERESTS, POLICIES AND STRATEGIES CONVERGE; 
WHERE THEY DIVERGE 
Generally speaking the flow from goals to policy to strategy to operational 
planning for the most part converge. From the President to the Task Force designated to 
fight AQIM, AQIM is assessed as a limited threat to U.S. interests in North Africa, and 
not an immediate threat. AQIM is seen as a having a weak link with AQ Senior 
Leadership, choosing more to use the AQ name for local benefits than assume AQ’s 
global agenda. As a whole, AQIM is viewed as an organization with Algerian roots and 
Algerian leadership, while portions of the organization operate within the Sahel. With the 
notion that AQIM is not as pressing a threat as others, is the belief that AQIM has 
potential to become a greater threat to the U.S. and its interests. AQIM’s potential to 
become a destabilizing force by trafficking weapons or colluding with other the extremist 
organizations of the region is a real threat that the NCTC, DOS and DoD agree requires 
vigilant monitoring. Moreover, AQIM’s KFR operations have become a major concern to 
the U.S. agencies that focus on North Africa. 
To counter AQIM, members of the U.S. government fundamentally agree that 
building partnership capacity and better governance are the roads to success against 
AQIM. There is a clear line from the NSS to the annual “Flintlock” exercises to involve 
regional actors in local matters for the purposes of  building partnership capacity to deal 
with AQIM. Better governance is emphasized in the U.S. AQIM policy produced by the 
President and DOS, but also reiterated in DoD strategy documents as using a “whole-of-
nation approach”379 and avoid, “getting ahead of the rest of the elements of national 
power.”380  The point being that although partnership capacity building is important in 
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the near-term, the long-term root cause for AQIM’s continued existence requires regional 
government reforms. From these aspects, the U.S. governments views on AQIM marry 
well, and primary actions that are required are pursued. 
However, policy, strategy and operational planning are not always in harmony. 
Differences in the priority AQIM should be given, versus other African threats is a major 
point of contention.   A common S-AF view is that, “Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, DRoC 
[Democratic Republic of Congo] and Nigeria keep State awake at night. Calling AQIM 
the number three terrorist organization in the world is a clear divide in opinion,” as stated 
by one official.381  The specific mention of the, “number three terrorist organization in 
the world,” contrasts the Pentagon official’s statement that AQIM is the, “number three 
threat [in Africa]...,” and is therefore more worthy of DoD activity than Sudan, Kenya, 
DRoC and Nigeria. 382  Though this may merely seem a semantic difference,  the 
difference in priorities have real consequences. For example, S-AF had called for DoD 
intervention in DRoC to halt the genocide, but until recently DoD has remained primarily 
focused on prosecuting the “War on Terrorism.”383  DOS has also served to thwart DoD 
attempts to escalate military operations within the Sahel stating, “State has resisted DoD 
efforts to ‘kineticize’ the conflict.”384  The DOS apprehension to DoD kinetic action is 
based on the concern that lethal action will only escalate AQIM’s violence; in particular, 
AQIM may take punitive action against U.S. targets that they had previously avoided.385 
The difference in priority is fundamentally caused by the organizational 
differences between DoD and DOS. DoD, which has led the War on Terrorism through 
the “defense approach” by, “identifying and destroying terrorist organizations,” has 
stayed predominantly fixed on its strong trait of directly combating terrorist 
organizations.386  DOS is more centered on the “development approach” which seeks to, 
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“use the non-military instruments of the USG [U.S. government] to establish peace and 
cooperation.”387  The variation in DoD and DOS organizational cultures have led to the 
feeling in DOS that if U.S. military direct action were to occur in the region, that those 
diplomats would have failed in their jobs.388  The real disparity is that DoD with the 
majority of the funding and resources to execute the counter-AQIM strategy is frequently 
at odds with DOS who holds the preponderance of authority to exercise policy in the 
region. More directly, DOS retains the authority for DoD to operate in the region, yet 
DOS cannot work towards its policy objectives without DoD assets. Variations in opinion 
are expected and are fundamentally beneficial to the total process, but cooperation, 
mutual understanding and synchronization are essential to move an AQIM policy/strategy 
forward. 
Another source of friction is the assessment of the Sahelian AQIM versus the 
Algerian AQIM. The crux of this debate is that those closest to the problem, in particular 
DoD, view the Sahelian AQIM threat as mostly a separate entity from that of the 
Algerian AQIM.   The first such reference in policy or strategy can be found in the NMS 
is the use of the word “Trans-Sahel” to describe the AQIM threat, which may have 
inadvertently or deliberately excluded the Maghreb from Mullen’s strategy.389  Why 
DoD leans toward a Sahelian centric AQIM is simple, their CT efforts in Algeria have 
been relatively fruitless and the most willing partners are in the Sahel. LTC Schmitt’s 
frustrated statement on the Algerian CMOCC as “a waste of time,” sets the stage for a 
DoD aversion to an Algeria centric strategy. 390  DoD’s Sahel focus is represented at 
every level of the DoD counter-AQIM strategy, but the NDS.391  The impact is that over 
time this divergence, which is based on both convenience and what can be done today, 
has an inertia onto itself that vectors strategy away from the original problem. This inertia 
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has led JSOTF-TS to suggest that the Sahelian AQIM force is a franchise of AQ of its 
own, separate from the Kabiyle AQIM.392   
NCTC/DOS generally disagree with the Sahelian focus of DoD, but do try to 
leverage the capacity building efforts to bolster the weaker partners of the Sahel. The 
thought being that if Algeria requires assistance they should ask for and pay for it,393 
while in comparison the Sahelian nations are currently incapable of handling security in 
their region.394  At issue is that the emphasis on the Sahel threat does not fully address 
the root cause of AQIM in Algeria. Ambassador Ensher bluntly stated, “If we win in the 
Sahel, say Mali or Niger, that’s nice, but if we fail in Algeria and there is significant 
destabilization and it spills over into Europe, we really have a problem.”395  DoS views 
that solving the Sahel problem does not necessarily solve the AQIM  problem, but is 
helpful. Therefore, DOS has been reticent to approve increases in DoD manpower in the 
Sahel.396 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The way in which the U.S. has pursued its counter-AQIM strategy is directly 
related to its national interests. Security, universal values and international order397 set by 
the President in the NSS set the stage for building security partnerships and cultural 
resilience established in the NSCT. 398  These policy documents influence and direct the 
policy objectives of the diplomats to, “contain, marginalize and disrupt AQIM,” through 
long-term efforts to help shape a Maghreb/Sahel that is resistant to AQIM.399  In the 
initial strategy documents DoD’s focus is on winning “the Long War”400 through “a 
whole-of-nation approach” requiring close synchronization of the USG to meet the threat 
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posed by AQIM.401  On the cutting edge of the AQIM policy/strategy, USAFRICOM and 
JSOTF-TS have implemented partnership building activities at the operational level to 
meet these national goals. 
The execution level of the counter-AQIM strategy has met with many challenges. 
Algeria, the nation most capable and willing to fight AQIM in the region, has remained 
an aloof partner to the U.S. and vehemently opposes U.S. “boots on the ground.”402  This 
opposition has produced a digression in the strategists’ most direct path to meeting their 
policy objectives. In response, DoD has shifted their focus away from Algeria to the 
Sahelian threat, where gains in building partner capacity can be more readily realized. 
The DoD shift due to operational realities and inertia have caused a divergence with the 
policy by increasing efforts in the Sahel beyond that envisioned at the outset.403  DOS’s 
concern with the deviation is that DoD will unnecessarily “kineticize” the conflict, and 
serve to escalate AQIM’s anti-western violence.404  From the point of view of DoD, 
constant pressure and proactive strikes are required to prevent AQIM from executing 
spectacular attacks on U.S. interests in the region or abroad.405  Combined these 
challenges are a source of much debate in the U.S. government over the best policy and 
strategy to defeat AQIM. Though these challenges are major sources of friction, overall 
the U.S. government views AQIM as a viable threat to U.S. interests abroad; which 
requires both due diligence and regional cooperation to ultimately address, counter and 
over the long-term build a region resistant to the Salafist radicalization of organizations 
like AQIM. U.S. policy and strategy will be scrutinized in the next chapter to determine if 
the U.S. truly has the endgame in mind. 
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VI. CONCLUSION:  THE WAY AHEAD 
AQIM has continued to persist despite the fact that it has become increasingly 
less likely to meet its objective of a Salafist Algeria. The reason AQIM has continued is 
for two basic reasons:  Algerian and neighboring states’ CT measures have not been 
completely successful and the original grievance in Algeria has remained unresolved. 
Within each of these two major categories, there are a myriad of complex sub-
components that fuel them. State measures to repress AQIM have pushed the 
organization far outside their preferred zones of operation into ungoverned spaces that 
represent a challenge to repression. Within these ungoverned spaces exists criminal and 
anti-establishment networks which facilitate AQIM’s survival. The impetus for the rise of 
jihadism in Algeria, that became AQIM, stems from the military junta of 1992. 
Fundamentally the power elites of the Algerian government have changed very little 
since these early days and still remain in control. Additionally, the takfiri ideology of 
AQIM does not lend itself a political resolution to their grievance. In effect AQIM has 
achieved a stalemate with each side maneuvering for an opportunity to gain some 
advantage that may someday lead to an end of either the Algerian state or AQIM. 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
This final chapter will review how these conclusions were made and a possible 
way ahead for U.S. policy and strategy against AQIM. The intent of this thesis was to 
draw attention to the factors that have allowed AQIM to survive. These factors, much like 
the origination of the problem, are predominantly Algerian. The apparent “shift to Al-
Qaeda” was nothing more than an open declaration for what was already present. An Al-
Qaeda name provided the credibility to the cause in light of AQ successes of the early 
2000s, but the Algerian jihad cause has remained unchanged. At issue is where does 
AQIM go from here without a notable evolution or re-structuring?  They are likely to 
succumb eventually to environmental and social pressures. Moreover, the U.S. role in the 
counter-AQIM strategy to hasten AQIM’s demise is without the significant Algerian 
partnership necessary to synchronize efforts and achieve a united end.  
 92
1. GIA Uniqueness and Insignificance of the “Shift” to AQ Affiliate  
Islamist movements have been a facet to the Algerian political and social structure 
throughout its history. The true significance of the GIA’s jihadist, no compromise, stance 
introduced a revolution in the form of North African Islamist organizations that held no 
previous precedent. With the introduction of the Arab-Afghan form of Salafism, and 
sponsors from the forefathers of Al-Qaeda, the GIA became an aberration. As the GIA 
drove their brand of Salafism off the rails it had to evolve to become the GSPC just to 
regain the dwindling support it had remaining from the Algerian people. The GSPC also 
looked to AQ for credibility and support to attempt to gain a renewed level of popular 
support. When the GSPC formally became an Al-Qaeda affiliate (AQIM) strategically 
little had changed. AQIM was merely a name change for the purposes of legitimacy and 
credibility. Though some new tactics were employed after the name change, the strategic 
direction and purpose of the organization had not shifted considerably. From this 
standpoint AQIM’s Al-Qaeda affiliation did not represent an appreciable evolution to the 
organization. Simply, there was no real shift once the GSPC became AQIM and the 
formal association with AQ thereafter represents no greater threat than the affiliation that 
had been on-going since the 1990s. 
2. A Local Jihad with an International Name 
Much like the goals of AQIM, the structure of AQIM has been unaffected by the 
change from the GSPC. The overall operational boundaries of AQIM are the same as 
they were under the GSPC. Also, the Supreme Commander, Council of Notables, Shura 
Council and all the sub-commanders (or emirs) are all Algerian. The result is that AQIM 
lacks the internationalism needed to expand beyond its constricted areas of operation. 
AQIM is capable of achieving tactical successes, but strategically these tactical successes 
have not materialized into appreciable gains toward an Algeria under Sharia. By failing 
to expand its objectives AQIM is in effect limiting itself in what it could achieve in a 
regional context. 
The choice of the “Maghreb” title was no accident, it was meant to convey the 
stature of a large organization with reach over the entire region of North Africa that was 
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at one time under Arab rule. However, the actual operating area of AQIM is limited to a 
small slice of this territory, that is bounded on the East and West by similar jihadist 
organizations. At issue is the territorial nature of these organizations and unwillingness to 
be affiliated with or be subsumed by the Algerian jihadists of AQIM. For their part, 
AQIM has done little to assuage the concerns of the fellow jihadist organizations of 
Morocco and Libya, or concoct some loose alliance. Similarly, AQIM’s collaboration 
with the far neighboring Salafist organizations like Boko Haram and Al-Shabab has been 
anecdotal thus far, with no evidence of AQIM as a North African nexus organization. 
Further there is little definitive proof of AQIM providing support to these organizations 
outside of using similar illicit networks and having parallel ideologies. Thus AQIM is 
sequestered to Algeria and the areas directly South, terminating where their Salafist 
ideology is culturally and religiously less compatible, in Sub-Saharan Africa.406  The 
local nature of AQIM’s operating area belies its international name and lends credence to 
AQIM’s persistence, as being the only strategic aim it is capable of achieving. 
3. Obsolescence, Repression, Succession and Crime 
AQIM has proven that it is capable of surviving under intense environmental 
pressures but history attests that without organizational change, few terrorist groups 
remain. Achievement of their goals or leading a new civil war, at the moment, seem out 
of AQIM’s reach. Less likely is AQIM’s reconciliation and entrance into the political 
stage without considerable fracturing of the organization into an AQIM off-shoot. More 
likely is AQIM’s irrelevance in Algeria as AQIM is further marginalized and separated 
from the populace (the target audience to their terrorism) by Algerian repression. 
AQIM’s structure is not impervious, spats over succession could easily break the 
organization along its independent cell lines. A last probable outcome over the long-term 
is an eventual fixation on criminality based on illicit activity as the main source of 
income and power for the cells and their leaders. Simply, AQIM could spend increasingly 
more time and resources on gaining and maintaining its criminal networks and territories 
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than fighting the jihad.. These ends will not occur in a vacuum, but require a catalyst to 
precipitate the proverbial beginning to the end which may cause a multitude of ends 
simultaneously. The challenge to counterterrorism planners is how to take advantage of 
fortuitous events and prod preferred outcomes without morphing a more virulent form of 
AQIM. 
4. Partnership Building without the Partner in Mind 
U.S. policy is to use regional partnerships and develop cultural resiliencies against 
groups like AQIM. The U.S. State Department sees this as containing, marginalizing and 
disrupting AQIM within the Maghreb and Sahel. Unfortunately the full weight of this 
effort has been thwarted by Algeria, the most desired partner by the U.S. to counter 
AQIM. The lack of desire by Algeria to partner with the U.S. more actively has frustrated 
U.S. CT efforts against AQIM. As a result the U.S. has sought more active partnerships 
with the Sahelian nations in effort to meet American policy objectives. These 
partnerships too have been fraught with obstacles, as the instability of the Malian, 
Nigerien and Mauritanian governments has prevented significant counterterrorism gains. 
As a consequence AQIM’s operating capabilities and areas of operation have not been 
greatly hampered since U.S. involvement in the Sahel. 
The primary block to U.S. success against AQIM has been the lack of a viable 
Algerian partnership. Though it is easy to blame Algeria for their lack of participation, 
from their point of view U.S. involvement is questionable. AQIM is effectively a 
fragment organization from Algeria’s most bloody civil war in their history. The U.S. 
offering unsolicited help to the Algerian cause would be akin to the French government 
offering to aid the Union, post civil war, with their Ku Klux Klan problem. Though this 
analogy is imperfect it does set the stage for a partnership that must be on Algerian terms. 
Beyond the fact that AQIM is predominantly an Algerian problem, that has escaped its 
borders; tactically speaking the Algerians have had the most success in the fight against 
AQIM and therefore likely have a better way forward. The weight of U.S. DoD efforts 
has imposed U.S. policy and strategy upon the Algerians without taking into account that 
the Algerians may be the best source for a campaign strategy against AQIM and therefore 
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the likely lead. Instead the U.S. has left Algeria to its efforts, while in the Sahel the U.S. 
attempts to institute some form of its strategy without synchronization. 
The lack of synchronization has not gone unnoticed. Within Algeria two multi-
national fusion cells have formed for the purposes of synchronizing intelligence and 
operations across the campaign area. These cells have not lived up to their promise, as 
they have served as monitoring posts for Algerian intelligence to determine the actions of 
its neighbors and western partners without providing the intended multi-lateral 
operational planning envisioned. 
U.S. strategy against AQIM is adrift without Algeria as the primary focus. Algeria 
holds two important elements necessary to AQIM’s survival:  the key to international 
cooperation to repress and subdue AQIM, and meaningful government reform that would 
resolve the original grievance caused by the junta. But what of the threat in the Sahel? 
AQIM operatives in the Sahel of Mali, Mauritania and Niger are a supporting 
effort to the overall organization and not the main effort. The Sahelian portion of AQIM 
which consists of a quarter of the total cells of AQIM provides: funding, weapons and a 
means to grab needed media attention.407  Without the Sahelian forces, AQIM would be 
handicapped, but not out of the fight. Conversely, if the Algerian network were targeted 
the Sahelian forces would become aimless without their primary connection to their 
cause, authority and legitimacy, but active as dispersed cells. More simply, U.S. strategy 
against the Sahelian sub-portion of AQIM represents a necessary component to the 
strategy, but finishing the Algerian nerve center-portion of AQIM is essential. 
B. WAY AHEAD 
To the very core of the AQIM problem a way ahead for the U.S. must thoroughly 
involve Algeria as both the owner of the problem and the most likely path to a resolution. 
The scope of this thesis does not incorporate techniques or methods to facilitate this 
necessary involvement. However, as a result of this thesis research it has become clear 
that a U.S. focus on the Sahel as an answer to AQIM may not fulfill U.S. 
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counterterrorism goals. Within this thesis there is a capacity to discuss general strategies 
forward or ways to evaluate future strategies against the AQIM of today. Though the 
AQIM of tomorrow may become the center for North African terrorism that it has 
claimed to be and that pundits fear; however, that evolution has yet to materialize. 
Therefore, three strategies are proposed below to combat the likely course of AQIM:  
seeking out and destroying AQIM, allowing AQIM to continue on its own natural course 
to ruin, and mitigation. Purposefully, these ways forward are directed toward U.S. policy 
and strategy as to what they could achieve. The intent is to provide polar opposite 
strategies in order to compare and contrast, knowing full well that a practical strategy 
may lay in between or as a combination thereof.  
1. Destroy AQIM to its Core 
AQIM persists due to the unsettled grievance caused by the junta and the use of 
safe haven in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel. In order to resolve these issues both 
must be aggressively addressed. First, the Sahelian portion of AQIM, which has become 
a center for KFR operations, must be systematically dismantled. Second, the Algerian 
regime, which functions similar to an autocracy, must make governmental reforms to 
repair the damage done in the 1990s. This strategy is the most aggressive and direct to 
counter AQIM. 
a. Attack the Sahelian Kidnapping for Ransom Network 
AQIM’s KFR operations have two main effects: funding and media 
attention. European nations have paid millions of Euros for each of their citizens 
kidnapped by AQIM.408  Though westerners are not the most kidnapped by AQIM, it is 
by far the most lucrative.409  Additionally, the international attention AQIM receives 
from these western kidnappings effectively keeps them in the media and bolsters their 
standing to the supporters of the jihad. By removing the elements of substantial funding 
and media attention AQIM will be less capable of expanding internationally and 
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sequesters their influence in Algeria and limits their influence to its neighbors. 
Fundamentally, this is what the current U.S. strategy in the Sahel is attempting to 
accomplish through Sahelian partners; to affect a level of security and governance in the 
Sahel to make this possible. 
Sahelian partnerships are not enough to stem the tide of the KFR, a more 
active role is required. The nations of the Sahel are too weak and preoccupied with their 
own internal problems to have a palpable effect on AQIM’s network. In the short-term, to 
make substantial gains requires the U.S. to make a personal commitment to erode the 
KFR network in the form of intelligence collection, tracking, intelligence sharing and if 
necessary, force. All of which require international and Algerian support. The European 
nations whose citizens have been held by AQIM and have subsequently paid exorbitant 
ransom are a major issue. However, diplomatic pressure to prevent such payments is 
unlikely to gain much traction with the European nations, but security cooperation is 
more likely. Intelligence sharing and tracking of ransom money flow could illuminate the 
network for better targeting. Another essential link to the KFR network is the Algerian 
headquarters of AQIM which authorizes the kidnappings and dispatches cell members to 
the Sahel to conduct these missions. AQIM will continue to dispatch operatives to the 
Sahel to conduct the KFR mission until they become no longer capable of transiting 
beyond the Algerian border. 
With international and Algerian cooperation, those involved in KFR need 
to be targeted directly. Within the Sahel this could be through some form of overhead 
intelligence collection that could lead to either regional partner interdiction, a 
U.S./European multi-national task force or the combination of the two based on 
capabilities and timeliness. Across the border into Algeria, a similar approach could be 
used, but would most likely be an Algerian unilateral operation with international 
support. Further, the multi-national intelligence collection effort could target illicit 
banking systems, accountants and couriers that can wear away at the financial backbone 
of AQIM. Given the necessity for Algerian support to these operations, this campaign 
needs to be on Algerian terms, if not Algeria’s overall campaign plan and lead. 
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b. Algerian Government Reform 
In the wake of the so called “Arab-Spring” where the former autocratic 
regimes of North Africa were toppled by popular uprising, Algeria has suppressed any 
notion of such reform. Algerian security forces swooped in promptly to disrupt the wave 
of popular support against President Abdelaziz Boutefikla’s now 13 year reign.410  The 
election results of May 2012 seem to confirm the regime’s grip over the electoral process 
and the inuring effect it has had on the people.411  As a result anti-regime supporters are 
receiving a boost, including AQIM, as the populace searches for viable solutions to the 
continued elitist rule in Algeria. 
The U.S. can and should support Algerian government reform that can 
bring about a peaceful resolution to the illegitimacy of the regime and quell the need to 
support change via violent jihad over the long-term. A core belief for the jihadists of 
AQIM is that change is not possible through the secular system as the power elites will 
inevitably corrupt the system to their favor.412  The thwarted “Algerian Spring” and 
predictable election results only serve to give credence to the jihadists claims and render 
some modicum of support, if only tacitly, to AQIM. Therefore, given that the U.S. sees 
an end to AQIM as one of its national goals, Algerian government reform must be the 
long-term overarching solution to that problem. How U.S. policy makers decide to go 
about this change is left to the experts, but all international diplomatic and economic 
pressure, as well as incentives should be considered. Without such declared support to 
reform, AQIM and the jihadist offshoots (that are sure to spawn from the base grievance), 
will continue to persist. 
                                                 
410 Adam Nossiter and Timothy Williams, “Algerian Riot Police Break Up Protest,” 
www.nytimes.com, February 12, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/africa/13algeria.html?wanted=all (accessed May 15, 2012). 
411 Adam Nossiter, “Algerian Election Results Draw Disbelief,” www.nytime.com. May 11, 
2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/world/africa/algerians-skeptical-of-election-results-favoring-
party-in-power.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 
412 Wright, The Looming Tower , 34–35. 
 99
c. Risks and Gains of the Destroy Strategy 
The “destroy” strategy has both the highest potential for risk and gain 
based on the aggressive and direct nature of the strategy. Both the risk and gain can be 
delineated into short-term and long-term over the course of the strategy. The short-term 
represents the intelligence collection and destruction of the KFR network. Pressure for 
the Algerian government to reform will be addressed as a long-term risk or gain. Both in 
the long-term and short-term, Algeria’s stability is the primary factor. 
Over the short-term, a ramp up to U.S. involvement in Algeria causes 
significant risk to the state of Algeria and westerners abroad. Any prospects of the 
counter-KFR campaign to be swift, holds counter to the previous 20 year resilience of the 
Algerian jihad. Therefore, U.S. and international involvement in Algeria will be 
noticeable and potentially enduring. The significance is that the Algerian people are 
keenly conscience to imperial western powers influence on Algeria, particularly that of 
France a key component to an international alliance against AQIM.413  Further, Algerian 
popular support for Iraq against the U.S. in the 1991 and 2003 invasions does not bode 
well for U.S. support to Algeria.414  There is substantial risk to the stability of the state of 
Algeria based on overt western collaboration, which, could represent a challenge to the 
Algerian regime. Additionally, open U.S. support to the Algerian regime may spark 
reprisals throughout the region, to which AQIM has formerly been unable or unwilling to 
target Americans. Potential gains may out-weigh these risks. 
The gains to such operations could hobble AQIM and provide a path to its 
eventual downfall. With the threat of KFR diminished, AQIM would lose its leading 
form of national celebrity and its means for propagating throughout the region. Further, 
the KFR network is not a network in isolation, but is composed of the operational cells of 
AQIM  and its resources. The destruction of the KFR network also represents the 
destruction of the cells of the Sahel and the financial pathway that leads directly to the 
                                                 
413 Post-colonial paranoia is still rampant in Algeria. This is a consequence of first being conquered 
by Arab armies in the seventh century, then being under the yoke of the Ottoman Empire and only recently 
winning their freedom from French colonialism in 1962. 
414 (1991) Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 245. (2003) Harmon, “From GSPC to AQIM,” 19. 
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main component of AQIM in Algeria. An additional gain is the partnership that will be 
forged with the nations combating AQIM, can serve to mitigate future problems that may 
arise in the region. Though, this strategy would be resource intensive, financially 
significant and likely last for years, it is the most direct and quickest of the three 
strategies.415 
Over the long-term a major shift must occur in U.S. relations with Algeria, 
which poses its own set of risks. The U.S. must pressure Algeria to reform its government 
to mend the root cause for the Algerian jihad. There is no guarantee that this process will 
proceed without violence or that the reforms will not result in an Islamist victory as in 
1991 or Egypt after its 2011 revolution against President Hosni Mubarak. In fact, reform 
may very well be the catalyst that sets Algeria into disarray. On the other hand, the 
Algerian regime may reject international pressure to reform and retain its authority, 
thereby eliminating the short-term gains against the KFR network in the Sahel, only to 
have it re-emerge years later. 
The long-term potential gain to Algerian reform is a true solution to the 
root cause of AQIM. Without the principal cause and rallying cry for the jihad against an 
unjust government AQIM’s relevance and support would witness a sharp decline that 
may prove catastrophic to its continued existence. Also, U.S. support against the Algerian 
totalitarian regime provides not only a local, but an international signal that the U.S. does 
truly support a just international order. Though this gain may take many years if not 
generations to achieve, the result is closure to the Algerian jihad issue caused by the 
junta. 
2. Let AQIM Die on the Vine 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, U.S. involvement against AQIM can be 
scaled back to allow AQIM to simply run its course. At first glance this strategy seems 
                                                 
415 One early estimate placed the U.S. cost for action in Libya in 2011 at just under one billion 
dollars. A similar cost could be expected for action in Algeria and the Sahel. Jason Ukman, “Libya war 
costs for U.S.: $896 million so far,” August 23, 2011,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-
washington/post/libya-war-costs-for-us-896-million-so-far/2011/08/23/gIQA5KplYJ_blog.html (accessed 
May 15, 2012) . 
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implausible as AQIM represents a viable threat and some sort of action must be taken to 
see that AQIM fails. However, AQIM is not a direct threat to the U.S. or its citizens, but 
a potential threat.416  Given that only one American has been killed by AQIM, the U.S. 
can be seen as having the least stake of the western powers to ensure AQIM’s demise.417  
Locally, Algeria is the primary stakeholder, proprietor of the problem and most capable 
internationally for CT efforts against AQIM. This strategy does not simply suggest that 
the U.S. drop the AQIM issue, but acknowledge that it is not their problem to solve and 
to let those who have more stake take the lead. 
The U.S. should not merely leave the Maghreb and Sahel, but take a passive role 
except where invited. First and foremost, the U.S. must maintain an ability to assess and 
monitor the AQIM situation as it develops for the purposes of being capable of taking 
proactive action if necessary. In order to meet these ends the U.S. will need to sustain 
intelligence and partnership capacity that can provide sufficient capability if needed; in 
military terms “phase zero” development.418  Beyond preparation and setting the 
conditions for action, if required, the U.S. should involve itself only where requested 
against AQIM. 
AQIM may reach its demise with or without U.S. intervention. Of the four likely 
ends to AQIM, repression is the one which the U.S. could directly influence. Obsolesce, 
failures in succession and criminal fixation can be caused by Algeria or by some 
fortuitous event. Just such an event may occur as a result of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali. 
The inevitable clash between Tuareg and Salafist ideologies may render AQIM’s safe 
haven no longer viable.419  U.S. involvement against AQIM serves to heighten AQIM’s 
stature as a credible international threat and provides an impetus to target American 
interests and citizens. AQIM is a severely myopic organization, there is little reason to 
                                                 
416 Official, State Bureau for Counterterrorism. 
417 Official, State Bureau for Counterterrorism. 
418 Phase zero is the shaping phase, it is what proceeds the deterrence phase. In order for deterrence to 
be effective, phase zero must have set the conditions for these efforts to the meet the challenge 
appropriately. A failure in phase zero operations can lead directly to failures as the crisis deepens and 
costly major combat operations may become the only viable resolution. Department of Defense, Joint 
Publication 5–0: Joint Operation Planning, Washington, D.C., August 11, 201,  III-39. 
419 Oumar, “Timbuktu rejects al-Qaeda.” 
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encourage it to take on a broader view. Over time, AQIM’s jihadist bent will be rejected 
by the Algerian population as they have before with the GIA and the GSPC. 420 
A scaled back strategy does offer less risk and fewer gains than the “destroy” 
strategy, but it is nonetheless worth analysis. The most apparent risk to a scaled back 
approach is that AQIM could grow a capability that it does not currently exhibit and 
emerge more capable of threatening U.S. interests and citizens. Further, a U.S. 
withdrawal may be perceived as a weakness to be exploited by AQIM. A withdrawal may 
serve to alienate U.S. CT partners in the Sahel who may feel abandoned after the 10 year 
long partnership stemming from the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The risks inherent to the 
withdrawal would be a less accurate intelligence picture of AQIM, which could mask the 
catastrophic attack on western interests AQIM analysts have feared since its inception. 
The prospects for substantial gains from this strategy are slim due to the lack of 
an active component to force an end of AQIM. Therefore, gains of the scaled back 
strategy can be measured in resources saved, a reduction in the perception of meddling in 
Algerian matters and empowering international powers. The amount of national treasure 
spent annually on the AQIM fight is roughly $170 million, not a tremendous amount of 
money as compared to typical U.S. federal spending, but this money could be used 
against higher CT priorities elsewhere.421  Beyond simple dollar figures, finite resources 
that are strained; such as military forces, intelligence experts and humanitarian assistance 
programs could be re-tasked to better fulfill the many more pertinent needs around the 
globe. 
U.S. involvement does not necessarily provide a positive return. Algeria has 
remained wary of U.S. intervention against AQIM from the outset. By scaling back, the 
U.S. serves to alleviate the tension, and may serve as a stepping stone for renewed 
relations. As with NATO involvement in Libya, the U.S. sought to take a supporting role 
                                                 
420 Mullen, Admiral Michael. “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America.” Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. February 8, 2011. http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011–02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-
_08_FEB_2011.pdf (accessed August 14, 2011),  6. 
421 USAID. Funding for the Trans-Sahel. and Schmitt, JSOTF-TS J3. 
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to global crises, to allow other nations to take on the mantle of global security.422  The 
benefits to the U.S. are more global partners capable of rendering a just international 
order and less focus upon the U.S. for lack of intervention where other nations are just as 
capable. Lack of U.S. involvement can serve to encourage others to solve the AQIM 
problem and not rely solely on the U.S. AQIM may not cease to exist under this strategy, 
but the prophesized threat to the U.S. may never materialize either. 
3. Mitigate and Marginalize AQIM 
Mitigation and marginalization simply means preventing AQIM from taking 
decisive action and separating them from the populace. Fundamentally, this strategy does 
not deviate from the current U.S. policy in principle, but differs by focus and realization. 
By focus the U.S. strategy must look to Algeria for true mitigating and marginalizing 
efforts; versus mitigating AQIM’s southern force while Algeria deals with the remainder 
of AQIM. In terms of realization, the U.S. must recognize that overall there are no short-
cuts to the counter AQIM strategy that may obviate the need for extended U.S. 
involvement over decades. Specifically, the aggrandized vision of military strikes in the 
Sahara wrapping up a 20 year long insurgency in a matter of weeks is at best optimistic 
thinking or at worst over-confidence. 
 In order to mitigate AQIM the use of security and CT forces are essential. 
Security forces include border security, local police and general anti-terrorism forces to 
deter or hamper AQIM efforts to conduct successful operations. CT forces are required, 
in typical military axiom: to find, fix and finish AQIM wherever they represent a tangible 
threat. Likely this would involve long-term security and CT partnerships with the goal of 
bolstering partnership capacity in a similar fashion to what is being currently executed by 
JSOTF-TS and the Department of State.423  The key difference between this strategy and 
the “destroy” strategy is that the intent is merely to manage the AQIM threat over many 
years by preventing its expansion and heading off major operations rather than seeking 
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out and annihilating the organization. Military strikes in the desert will be required, but 
only to serve the purpose of keeping AQIM confined to their inhospitable desert and 
Kabiyle Mountain refuges. These strikes need not be conducted by U.S. forces, but 
simply supported in such a way as to allow partner forces to gain capability and address 
the problem themselves. 
By mitigating the threat, fundamentally AQIM can be marginalized and secluded 
from its intended areas of influence. Marginalization also implies that AQIM’s raison 
d’être, the Algerian grievance, is sufficiently resolved. As with the first strategy, U.S. 
diplomatic policy must seek to persuade and where necessary pressure Algeria to reform 
its government in order to expropriate any remaining popular support from AQIM. In 
concert with this effort is the acknowledgement of Tuareg grievances as they attempt to 
establish their own nation, Azawad.424  In so doing the U.S. detaches the weak alliance 
between AQIM and the Tuareg’s that served as a marriage of convenience based on 
similar anti-government pursuits. Without Tuareg assistance or apathy, AQIM loses an 
essential environmental factor that has allowed their survival amongst the wasted 
expanses of the Sahara. Essentially, AQIM will have lost its audiences and succumb to 
obsolescence or criminal fixation. 
The risk and gains to this strategy are as to be expected, about the median of the 
other two strategies. By seeking to mitigate and marginalize AQIM there is an intrinsic 
risk that the threat may only grow without a more direct approach. The gains from this 
strategy are unlikely to be realized in the near-term, but may ultimately provide a 
sufficient end to the jihad, although this may take decades. Can the ends justify the 
means? 
A major risk to this strategy is its defensive nature and its reliance on detection. 
As with the scaled-back strategy, intelligence is paramount. By seeking to mitigate or 
manage the AQIM threat versus attack it, the U.S. cedes the initiative. AQIM can plan 
and prepare its spectacular attacks from its safe haven, while only venturing out to 
execute them with little advanced warning. Given the long time horizon of this strategy, 
                                                 
424 Oumar, “Timbuktu rejects al-Qaeda.”  “Azawad” is the Tuareg name for the territory North of 
Timbuktu that includes portions of the Sahara to include parts of Niger and Algeria. 
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there may be ample opportunity for AQIM to seize on auspicious events and make gains 
similar to the scaled-back strategy risks. Contrary to the scaled-back approach, this 
strategy will require a long-term investment in manpower, material and funding. Using 
the $170-million-dollar-a-year amount currently used against AQIM as an estimate, the 
financial commitment of this strategy would easily breach two to three billion dollars 
over ten years. Again, the amounts are not inconsequential as money and resources used 
against AQIM are assumed to not be available for other urgent or emerging priorities 
elsewhere. 
The benefits to this course of action strike a balance between the two previous 
strategies. First, the U.S. meets its national goals by fostering security and partner 
capacity in a region of inherent instability. Second, the mitigation strategy dovetails well 
with the mitigation strategy of steady government reform by the Algerian government. 
By realizing that this strategy will play out over tens of years, partners can settle in for 
long-term permanent solutions instead of quick fixes that ultimately degrade or have 
unintended consequences. Lastly, by seeking to mitigate and marginalize AQIM, the U.S. 
is attacking AQIM’s strategy by preventing it from becoming a regional terrorist power  
and sapping the acclaim and notoriety it would gain from a combating a major western 
power. AQIM would fade into obscurity. 
4. Evaluation 
The third strategy, that of mitigating and marginalizing AQIM seems the best fit 
for the AQIM of today. AQIM’s indirect threat to U.S. interests requires a proportional 
effort that will not generate unintended consequences in the wake of overzealous military 
action. The long-term strategy of mitigation allows for the most flexibility of the three 
strategies to meet the natural ebbs and flows of geopolitics and environmental changes. 
Direct action, when required, is conducted by, with or through partners and most directly 
empowers these partner nations to take the responsibility for their own security. Lastly, 
this strategy has the primary end in mind and has the most leverage to encourage an 
Algerian political reformation. 
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These three strategies have some significant commonalities that deserve mention. 
Namely, all three strategies require an intelligence network capable of gleaning the true 
disposition of AQIM and a capacity to intercede when and where the need arises. Neither 
of these two requirements should be taken lightly, nor should the requirement to have an 
in-depth knowledge of the terrain and local culture be assumed as a tertiary task. Failure 
at this preparation level can lead to costly mistakes in lives and to a lesser extent the 
willingness to allow further operations against AQIM. Disagreements like the 
interpretation of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) - 38 between the 
Departments of State and Defense has served to hamper just the sort of preparation and 
intelligence collection efforts that are vital to the success of counter-AQIM strategies.425  
Without the necessary infrastructure in place any sort of predictive analysis would be 
incapable of providing the clarity that decision makers in Washington will need to make 
apt decisions in a timely manner. 
Algeria is also at the center of all three strategies, because a Sahelian solution 
only addresses the periphery issue and not the source of AQIM. All courses of action are 
incumbent on Algeria resolving the longstanding dispute of the junta, which has allowed 
AQIM’s primary cause to have traction with the people of Algeria. With a seemingly 
legitimate government in place the need for a jihad organization or silent support for one 
will diminish. To survive, AQIM does not require active support, but mere apathy from 
the populace to have the ability to operate within Algeria. 
Though a mitigation and marginalization strategy is best for dealing with the 
AQIM of today, the other two strategies do have situations where they may be more 
appropriate. If AQIM were to present a significant direct threat to the U.S. and its 
interests or if the government of Algeria were to collapse into turmoil; the destroy 
strategy would be more appropriate. Both of these situations represent an urgent need for 
action and place AQIM far higher in the CT priority. On the contrary, if AQIM were to 
                                                 
425 NSDD-38 is a directive from 1982 which allows U.S. Embassies to control the number of 
personnel within its confines. The dispute has become more about controlling DoD or circumventing DOS 
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represent less of a CT priority to the U.S. or a regional partnership with Algeria at the 
helm does appear to be moving in the right direction; a scaled-back strategy may be 
apropos. 
C. THESIS CONLCUSION 
AQIM is more unlikely than ever to reach its goal of establishing an Islamic state 
in Algeria since its history as the GIA, yet it endures. The apparent resilience of AQIM 
relies less on the actual organization than the environmental factors that have rendered it 
extant. A long tradition of Algerian jihadism has founded the basis for AQIM’s being. By 
co-opting local anti-government groups, Algerian jihadists have long been allowed to live 
among and collaborate with Berber and Tuareg separatists. Turning to international 
notoriety to augment its local jihad the GSPC became AQIM even though an Al-Qaeda 
link had long since been established. Effective Algerian security measures have pushed  
portions of AQIM to ungoverned spaces where regional security pressure is non-extant 
and illicit networks are numerous. These environmental factors have allowed AQIM to 
survive. 
The U.S. must have an endgame in mind with respect to its counter-AQIM 
strategy. Potential ends for AQIM rely heavily on Algeria to bear the weight of the effort, 
whereas Sahelian efforts are peripheral to a complete end. U.S. strategy should 
subordinate the Sahel focus, as a Sahelian solution is not sufficient, while an Algerian 
solution is both necessary and sufficient to AQIM’s demise. An end solution to AQIM 
demands more than the brute force Algeria has exerted for 20 years, it requires change at 
the foundation of the regime. If the U.S. continues to view AQIM as a threat to its 
national interests, a strategy that cuts to the source is required, while the side-show in the 
Sahel represents a waste of time, resources and talent that could be better employed on 
more urgent threats. AQIM represents a lower priority challenge that if not dealt with 
properly can become a major priority or draw on indefinitely like the FARC. The volume 
of challenges the U.S. is faced with since the onset of the War on Terrorism demands a 
level of efficiency and effectiveness to right-size efforts in order to meet these challenges 
and reorient on new emerging challenges. In this regard the U.S. must strive to meet 
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AQIM with the most appropriate solution with the least force possible to expedite its 
departure so U.S. CT efforts can be engaged against remaining Al-Qaeda affiliate in other 
parts of the world. 
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